WHAT HAPPENED IN TRIESTE ...
Address delivered to the students and faculty of the
Ground General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, 5 October 1949.
by
Colonel Alfred C. Bowman, GSC
Office of the Chief of Staff
United States Army
3B 730 The Pentagon
Washington DC
... Every time I try to tell an audience what happened in Trieste,
invariably I feel that I am stressing too much the job I did myself --
the military government job -- and giving inadequate attention to the
part played in the Trieste occupation by all of the various military
components and organizations, British and American, who cooperated to
produce the result.
It was a very complicated command situation, and it is inevitable
that in trying to say what I have to say in a relatively short period of
time, I must neglect stressing, as much as I would like to, those
elements. Everybody played a part.
Colonel Skelly has spoken to you of the attitude of the local press
toward me and toward Allied Military Government. There was only one
paper in the area which at all times supported me. That was "The Blue
Devil", which was published by Colonel Skelly for the 88th Division at
that time. Whatever the local press said about us we could always be
sure of enthusiastic support from "The Blue Devil", and it was a
comfort, sometimes.
Now my assignment this afternoon is to tell you something about what
happened in the Trieste area in the last year of the war, and the two
years following the war. ... I think that some of the most interesting
and helpful information which can come from anyone delivering a talk of
this kind comes as a result of questions. I hope there will be some.
There is a common tendency, these days, I think, to misunderstand
the nature and function of military government, and I'm afraid I'd
contribute to it by telling you about the Trieste situation and
operation, if I didn't spend a few minutes in advance discussing the
function of military government, and the Military Government officer, in
active operations.
The subject is one which I think is likely to be greatly
misunderstood, particularly by Regular Army officers, chiefly because a
relatively small number of them have ever had much to do with it
directly, and also because it hasn't been stressed, as much as I think
it should be, in our Service Schools.
The average Military Government officer of the last war was
basically a citizen in uniform -- there is no doubt about that -- and
Regular Army people had a lot of trouble with him. There can't be any
question about that either. He was an emergency officer, who partly by
reason of that very fact -- the fact that he was a civilian -- was
considered better qualified by experience and personal outlook to direct
the resources of occupied areas, under trained military direction,
toward the defeat of the enemy.
Whether that thesis is sound or not, is beside the point. When
another war comes along, the Military Government officer will
undoubtedly be selected on the basis of the same considerations. The
officers who served in Military Government in the last war, with few
exceptions, have returned to civil life, and will be replaced by a new
batch, when the time comes
I am sure that none of you who have any experience with Military
Government in the last war will question the importance of selecting and
training those future Military Government leaders in a manner which will
insure their full understanding of their relationship to other Army
elements, Army operations, and channels of command.
I'd like to make the point this afternoon, as I made it this
morning, however, that I consider it at least equally important that you
potential commanders of tactical and service units who are being
educated here and elsewhere, and the other potential commanders who
constitute the faculties of schools like this, appreciate the functions
and responsibilities, the capabilities and limitations, of Military
Government in facilitating military operations.
It is a two-way business. A Military Government officer can try as
hard as he will to accommodate himself, and to learn the Army score, but
it's not going to do any good unless there is at least a modicum of
understanding on the other side, as to what he is trying to accomplish.
If you don't understand each other, you and the Military Government
officers will work at cross purposes, which won't help you, or the war
effort, or the country.
I point out to you that this thing called 'Military Government' is
not always established in one fell swoop, by proclamation of a theater
commander. It just happens, sometimes, and it sometimes happens in a
relatively small area.
Military Government exists whenever a detachment commander -- any
military commander, on any level -- is required by the exigencies of the
situation to exercise some degree of control over the civilian
population -- in other words, to act like a government. As soon as it
does happen, the military commander becomes subject to international law
-- to various rules which didn't apply to him during the rest of the
time. You may be -- any of you could be -- that commander, sooner than
you think.
While few of you, probably, have had any direct experience in
Military Government, I know that all of you have been soundly educated
in basic military doctrine. Therefore, I should like you to consider
what I say in the next few minutes, not as a new subject, but merely as
an extension of familiar principles.
I think you will agree that any foreseeable future war -- like the
last war, but perhaps more so -- will differ in several important
respects from the classic wars of the past, and that one of these
respects will undoubtedly be the heavy involvement of civilians.
I am not going to argue this, or brief it at length, The reasons,
based on strategy, weapons, and objectives, are obvious. It's certain
that tomorrow's battles will not be fought in great open spaces, with no
civilians around. It is obvious to anyone who thinks about it that in
the land warfare of the future, masses of non-combatant people will be
as normal a factor as the nature of the terrain, the weather, the
relative sizes of the forces engaged, and all the other elements which
you have been accustomed to considering in estimating military
situations.
A second relatively new consideration is the tremendous expense of
war, as we carry it on now. A primary factor here is the expense of
maintaining and training today's fighting man. Greater education,
greater knowledge, and consciousness of his importance as an individual
have made him a very complicated and expensive weapon -- combat
instrument
Another factor is the highly qualified and scientific character of
our weapons, and the expense of producing tem.
A third very important one, particularly from the standpoint of my
remarks today, is our obvious preference, which undoubtedly will
continue, for fighting our wars in other peoples' countries. It gives
us many advantages -- preserves our families and resources, and enables
us later to resume the normal peacetime business much more readily.
However, it also infinitely increases the cost of carrying our men,
weapons, and supplies to points of contact with the enemy.
Finally, we Americans, I think I can say without fear of
contradiction, at a state of civilization where we will not, knowingly,
permit our soldiers either deliberately to liquidate civilian
populations, or permit them to perish in order to get them out of the
way of our forces.
Even if this were not true -- if we weren't morally committed to a
policy of supporting civilian populations whose lands we occupy -- I
point out to you that the Swiss recently proposed, and the Russians are
vigorously championing, a new provision of international law which would
require military commanders in occupied areas to maintain the people in
accordance with the standard of living enjoyed in the occupied area
prior to the commencement of the occupation.
Now, that isn't international law yet. As a soldier, I hope it
never will be, because I realize what it would mean -- particularly if
we did -- as I am sure we would -- try to live up to it, and had no more
assurance than we have now, have that the principal proponents of the
thing would live up to it, the other way. But if it were accepted by
the United States (and there are people who, speaking officially for the
United States, have indicated approval of the proposal) we might in the
future be required -- not only as a matter of humanity but as a matter
of positive international law -- to ship the means of livelihood to the
enemy people, through the enemy's own submarine lanes.
During early World War II, the problem of control of people, which
we now call military government, was regarded from the reactionary point
of view which holds that the presence of civilians in the theater of
operations is an unmitigated evil, calling merely for the application of
sufficient force to keep them out of our way. There was a lot of talk
about "occupational military police", and the use of tear gas, and of
fire hoses.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the people,
institutions, and resources of the territories in which we carry on
military operations in the future, must be carefully planned for, both
as a possible burden -- as an impediment -- and also as an important
resource to be exploited for our own benefit, within the limits
established by the international law of war.
During early World War II, the problem of control of people, which
we now call military government, was regarded from the first of those
viewpoints, which assumed that the presence of civilians in the theater
of operations is an unmitigated evil, to be abated by applying
sufficient force to keep them out of our way. There was a lot of talk
about 'occupational military police', and the use of tear gas, and of
fire hoses.
This was the German idea in World War I, and authorities generally
agree, I think, that it helped considerably to lose them that war.
Its persistence for a short time in our own thinking is the natural
result of planning, without satisfactory recorded experience, (and you
would be surprised how little there was, after 27 occupations in which
this country participated) by men whose training quite naturally, and
normally, and properly, caused them to place their trust primarily in
the meeting of force with greater force.
Very limited field experience in the early days of the last war
demonstrated conclusively that the concept of control of civilians by
force was impracticable -- if for no other reason than that it simply
required the use of too many men who ought to be fighting.
Still, the negative aspect of military government - the problem of
control of people so as to keep them out of the Army's way - remained,
and still remains, of prime importance.
A little progress by trial and error proved, however, that even this
negative job could be done better and at infinitely less cost through
skillful manipulation, by trained officers, of all the economic and
human factors which control the behavior of people wherever you find
them: by getting them back to work - in their schools - living their
lives in as normal a way as possible, and causing a minimum amount of
trouble.
This aspect of the job - negative control - is stressed in an
article by Major Leroy E. Wade in the July 1949 issue of the "Military
Review" published by the Command and General Staff College, which I
think you ought to read. The article is brief and., since it is
confined to military government in the division in combat, I think that
Major Wade was probably justified in omitting reference to the other
side of the picture - turning to our own use the positive potentialities
of the territories in which our own armies operate - which I predict in
the future will become the most important aspect of the work of the
military government officer.
Recognition of these positive potentialities also contributed to the
radical change of viewpoint on this subject which occurred early in
World War II, with rich rewards in reduced costs and improved combat
efficiency - particularly, I may say, in the Mediterranean theatre.
Please understand that I don't contend that any future American army
operating overseas will ever 'live off the land' or arm itself locally
with any decisive weapon. At the same time, I think you should know
(and I am sure that those of you who served in some places realize) that
there are armies in this world who still come very close to living off
the land, thereby perhaps lessening their effectiveness to some degree,
but also minimizing the cost of moving them around.
Nevertheless, the operations of our forces far from home will
undoubtedly continue to involve logistical problems unparalleled in
history. That's not the point. The point is that, in view of this very
fact, future margins of victory will more than ever be measured in terms
of a few extra troops, or a shipload of supplies. If even a relatively
few things which an army needs can be found and exploited in the theater
of operations, these will, more often than ever, make a decisive
operational difference.
The logical first step, for example, toward avoiding the necessity
of shipping civilian food for thousands of miles is to locate the
supplies of hoarded commodities already present in every theater of
operations. There can be no doubt that, throughout the war in Italy,
more wheat and basic foods were hoarded in various places on the
peninsula and in the islands, than we ever imported with all the dozens
of ships - hundred of ships - that we had to put through German
submarine lanes to get there.
Effective military government operations providing a means of
discovery and use of these things, which are always present in a place
where people know a week in advance that war is going to happen, can
greatly improve our effectiveness next time.
The second step, obviously, is to get the farmer back to his farm,
and the worker back in his factory, each producing the agricultural and
manufactured things that both his people and our troops need, so that we
don't need to bring those things over in our ships. There was a lot
more of that done than perhaps some of you realize in the middle of the
last war, in the only theater where it lasted long enough to get going,
which was the one I happened to be in.
The burden on the highly-trained and overworked combat engineer can
be lessened by employing local contractors to repair bridges which will
be needed in the next campaign, but can wait a few weeks.
The mines, oil wells, and other natural resources of the enemy can
be tapped to save shipping space for our troops and weapons.
There are a thousand other obvious examples, but these are all I'll
discuss.
It may help you to understand the problem a little better if I tell
you that the OSS officers who had successfully promoted guerilla and
sabotage activities behind the enemy's lines during combat, often became
exceptionally efficient civil affairs officers in the same areas
afterwards.
In both jobs, they served the same basic purpose. By depriving the
enemy, before we drove him out, of the benefits on local resources, and
later by turning those same resources to our own use, they diminished
our logistical problems and made it possible to bring up into the combat
area men, supplies and weapons which we would otherwise not have had
available.
This is the real and probably the basic combat military government
job. It is just as essential to the effective operation of a field
force as the work of any other administrative or technical service. The
coordinated action of all is necessary to victory.
In few fields of military activity, incidentally, can so few people
produce such tremendous results. The entire temper and spirit of a
large town - of a province - can be controlled by the personality of one
able and diligent officer who knows where to touch - where the heart of
the civilian society or the civilian government is - how to approach it,
and how to handle the man, who, one way or another, controls it.
Its manpower and its treasure can be immediately devoted to our
service, because such a man knows his business.
The product of this kind of activity can not be realized in any
other way, and least of all by force.
I hope that these few remarks have helped some of you to orient
yourselves in a neglected subject. If I hadn't taken time to make them,
then as I said in the beginning, I feel that I would, against my own
desire, have contributed to a common impression that AMG, or Military
Government, is a sort of spearhead UNRRA, which precedes ECA, or
something of that kind, after a war.
Such, I assure you, gentlemen, is not the case.
It is not surprising, however, that four years after the surrender
of our last official enemy most people should associate "military
government" with what's happening in Japan, Korea, Austria, Germany, and
Trieste during that period.
These operations, although called "military government", are of a
very different nature from the kind of operation I have been talking
about, although of course all contribute to the general objective of
forwarding national policy.
Whereas under normal wartime conditions the function of military
government is to support the troops, in all these situations - Trieste,
Germany, Austria, and so on - it has been rather the job of the troops
to support military government.
The Trieste operation was, and still is, of this class, although it
was a perfectly normal outgrowth and extension of belligerent occupation
practices developed by AMG in Italy in the combat phase.
In order for you to understand what happened in 1945 in Venezia
Giulia, it is for this reason necessary to look briefly at the military
government scheme for Italy proper, and at some of the special factors
in the Mediterranean Theater.
One of these special factors was total allied integration. The
initials "AMG" are used loosely to cover military administration of
civilian matters in many places, but nowhere except in Italy was the
military government truly allied, on all levels, for any prolonged
period.
I'm informed that there was a short time, immediately after the
D-Day invasion, when British and American officers did work on this
basis in France (which, however, was never in the proper sense military
government) but that this condition lasted for only a week or two. I
think it fair to say that the only place it ever got full play was in
Italy.
Only here, did military government officers of both participating
allied nationalities conduct the operational military government job
shoulder to shoulder from the national capital to the farm village,
maintaining a unified occupied nation, and at the same time learning to
live with, and learn from, each other.
Another special factor was the existence of the status of
co-belligerency, which Italy enjoyed after her surrender to the Allies,
and her declaration of war on Germany. As a result of this status -- as
I'm sure most of you in the audience are old enough to remember -- it
became Allied policy to build up, and entrust power as early as possible
to, the Italian government.
The situation called for a special plan which I think was admirably
suited to the needs of a special situation.
All of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia was divided into 'Regions', the
boundaries of which, except for certain later administrative
consolidations, corresponded roughly to the historic "compartimenti",
with familiar names: Starting with the islands: (pointing to map)
Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily; from the bottom of the "boot" upward:
Calabria, Lucania, Campania, Puglia, Abruzzi e Molise, Lazio, Umbria,
Marche, Tuscany; then Emilia, Piemonte, Lombardia, and "the three
Venices" -- "Tre Venezia": Venezia Tridentina, Venezia Euganea, and
Venezia Giulia in the extreme east (then considered merely one of the
'three Venices') which was to be the background of most of the matters I
want to talk to you about this afternoon.
The compartimento of Puglia, incidentally, the "heel" of Italy, was
subjected only briefly to Allied Military Government. From almost the
very beginning, that was the headquarters of the Italian Government, and
at Bari and Brindisi, at one time or another, Marshal Badoglio and one
stenographer constituted that government for a long time. Later it was
moved forward until it reached the national capital -- the traditional
capital -- of Italy at Rome. And there, of course, it stayed.
The "compartimenti" which I show you on this map are not normal
political subdivisions of Italy. Mussolini controlled Italy from Rome
by communicating directly with 94 provinces, whose prefects he
appointed. When the question of what to do with Italy were discussed at
the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, one very able
instructor-officer there became famous for his remarks -- his
unanswerable argument: "If Mussolini can do it, why can't we?"
Mussolini did it, but we decided that it would be better for us,
during the war, to institute this intermediate echelon based on the
historic "compartimenti" which were not part of the normal governmental
structure, but the people of whom always had something in common
culturally, or linguistically or otherwise and, in any event, were
separated from their neighbors by some normal geographic barrier, in
most cases
In any event, that was the scheme.
There was provided for each of these regions a team of officers and
men, in number half British and half American, headed by a colonel or
brigadier whose deputy, of the other nationality, commanded the
detachment of his army which made up half the team. The teams ranged in
size from about a hundred twenty-five to two hundred fifty officers, and
a somewhat greater number of enlisted men. They were assembled in the
rear, split into staff sections and provincial teams, and made ready,
either in skeleton or complete form, to move forward upon the liberation
of the areas for which they had been trained.
Now, you will recall, if you are familiar with the Italian campaign,
that it was conducted by two Armies -- one American and one British: the
Fifth Army on the west side of the peninsula, west of the Apennines,
which extend the full length of the peninsula, and then have a piece
across here to (pointing to map) - and on the east side by the British
Eighth Army - the troops which engaged in the first successes of the war
at El Alamein, under General Montgomery, and which moved up the
less-populated and wilder east side of the peninsula. The 'Regions' at
one time or another, crossed all of the operational boundaries of these
armies, each of which had a little civil affairs detachment of its own,
whose function was to go ahead and render first aid - to do the things
that had to be done during the first few days or weeks -- and then turn
over to these permanent static teams.
In order to facilitate that, the personnel of these teams would be
sent forward to the armies as the armies approached the places for which
they were destined, either as individuals (as the Fifth Army usually
insisted on having it) or as provincial teams (as the more tolerant
British Eighth Army permitted it to be). They moved right into their
respective areas with the Army personnel, then the Army AMG personnel
would move on as the Army moved on, and the permanent military
government personnel would remain behind.
It worked pretty well. Of course, you get a lot more cooperation in
the middle of a war than you do at any other time. It took a certain
amount of tolerance and understanding, particularly with this matter of
full integration; British officers accepting commands from American
commanders, and vice versa. It worked pretty well, in spite of it.
All of the groups were supervised, as to technical matters, and as
to British-American occupation policy, by the Allied Commission, which
was composed of military personnel and was also headquarters of AMG.
This Allied Commission started originally at about the time of, or
immediately following, the invasion of the peninsula of Italy at
Salerno, and it was at first located at Bari and Brindisi, near the
two-person Italian Government.
It later moved from there to Naples, and eventually to Rome, where
it continued to carry on the business of dealing with the Italian
Government on behalf of the United States and Great Britain, at the same
time conducting Allied Military Government, as far as the technical
aspects of it were concerned.
As operations scaled off, things quieted down, and the Armies moved
further north, the Allied Commission would take over from the Regions,
or the Regions would change their complexion. Instead of dealing
primarily with the Armies, they would deal primarily with Rome. The
next step would be for Allied Military Government and the Allied
Commission to release the Regions completely to the Italian government.
This happened rather rapidly, and sometimes we who were in it
thought a little bit prematurely -- but it was part of our Allied policy
of building up Italy and encouraging her: by holding out rewards of this
kind and giving her assurance of our good faith, to bring her forward,
to make her produce armies and supplies, to help us.
Those of you who served in Italy will remember that the winter of
1944-'45 was a pretty bad time -- just before the last push. We had
moved very rapidly up from a point not far north of Naples -- the
Volturno -- clear up to here (pointing to the Pisa-Rimini area). For a
time the progress of the Fifth and Eighth Armies along here (pointing to
map) taking Rome in early June. For a time the progress of the Fifth
and Eighth Armies along here (pointing to map) was about 15 miles a day.
Then something known happened in September and October, and we got
bogged down, along what was known then as the Pisa-Rimini line: Rimini
here, Pisa over here (pointing to map) not far from Leghorn [Livorno]
(in which, undoubtedly, some of you spent more time than you liked).
During the four or five months which succeeded this slowdown,
accompanied by the heaviest rain in years (very difficult conditions
because of the mountains and swamps which were present here on the
little coastal plain where I kept most of my people) this part of Italy
was all cleared up -- all ready except for the presence of very
considerable numbers of troops (pointing at map) waiting to go across
the mountains, and operating ports at Leghorn and Ancona, to be handed
back to the Italian government.
At that time attention shifted from the southern part of Italy, to
the north. This was obviously going to be the last big show. We wanted
to do it right, and we were in a position, more or less, to cut off at
about this point (pointing to north Apennines on map) and forget about
it -- confident that as soon as the Army moved forward we would be able
to hand everything south of the mountains back to the Italian
government.
Now this (pointing to area north of Apennines on map) while the
smallest part of Italy, is by far the most important, economically and
otherwise. Emilia Region, which I have shaded here because it was my
Region -- the part that I administered during the war -- is the
breadbasket of Italy, producing enough food for three or four times its
own population, on a very broad central plain, on the south side of the
Po River. It was also the home at that time -- at least the temporary
home -- of most of the partisans, whom we had been financing and arming
for a long time, and who were in the north slopes of the mountains here
(pointing to map). Piemonte Region, Lombardia Region, and Emilia Region
were put under American officers. Liguria and the three Venices were
put under British Brigadiers, and the stage was set for the show which
was to start about the middle of April.
The push started about that time. On the 21st of April, Bologna
fell; on the 23rd, I was in there. I would have been in there on the
21st, if I hadn't had as my guest at Rimini that weekend the President
of the Allied Commission [Harold Macmillan], who wanted to go in with
me, wearing his derby hat. We didn't feel that the time was ripe the
first day.
Knowing very little of the events there that were to take place, and
not speculating at all about Trieste -- being scarcely conscious of its
existence -- we went into Bologna to do the normal military government
job, which you can consider in the light of what I said during the
earlier portion of my remarks.
I personally considered my principal task to be securing the
surrender from the Partisans in the north slope of the Apennines of the
arms which we had been bundling in to them for the past two years. It
was quite a job, and we followed substantially the same procedure, which
I will describe briefly to you later, in connection with the matter of
disarming the Partisan police force which we found in Trieste.
Meanwhile my assistants restarted the economic and political
machinery of the Region. Before the first of July, I was able to report
to Rome that my Region would be ready for transfer to the Italian
government by the first of August. Actually, it was so transferred,
although the rest of north Italy remained under Allied Military
Government until the first of the following January.
I didn't intend, by this report of accomplishment, to indicate my
availability for an extended and difficult post-war assignment, but that
was the effect it had.
As I say, we knew very little about Trieste in those days, although
we were only a matter of 150 to 200 miles from it. I had heard that
Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito had, earlier in the year, had a
talk about Venezia Giulia, which I knew dimly to be the portion of the
pre-World War II Italy which prior to the treaty following World War I,
was part of Austria. Our forces, it was said, would proceed to the
Italian border at Fiume, and south, in the Istrian Peninsula, to Pola.
Here's Fiume up here, in this little square, and Pola down here
(pointing to map). In other words, we would proceed to the pre-war
boundary of Italy, and take over Venezia Giulia along with the other
Venices, on the same basis as the rest of the [Italian] peninsula. There
was no special provision made for the problems or the personnel needs
which later developed there. Giulia was just one of the three Venices.
Under the agreement, also, I understood, Marshal Tito, when he
reached this line, would wheel right and proceed to the north, where
there was still a very important enemy to be conquered before the war
was over. We would then have the situation of the American, British,
and Jugoslav armies all closing in on central Europe where the war still
had to be fought out.
The British Eighth Army -- all this time I was in Bologna and Emilia
-- continued, pursuant to its normal plan, to move around the top end of
the Adriatic through all of these provinces: (pointing to map) Forli and
Ravenna, and Ferrara, and Rovigo, and Padua, and Venice, and Treviso --
a long haul. There are a number of swamps up in there -- it's not
nearly as simple and as easy as it looks -- and eventually to Udine and
the Isonzo River.
And at the Isonzo River, they met these 'allies' whom they hadn't
ever seen before -- in various kinds of nondescript grey uniforms.
Mr. Tito hadn't even paused when he came to his national boundary.
He kept right on going -- but fast.
I don't mean to say that it was a surprise, although it was hard to
realize that Tito had not only marched into Trieste and taken possession
of it,but had marched right on to the Isonzo River.
We went ahead (that is, the British and New Zealand troops who were
up that way) and went into Trieste too, but the Jugoslavs were allowed
to maintain administrative control for the next 40 days, which was a
pretty rough time for the people who lived there.
Now the balance of what I am going to say will involve only the area
within this rectangle (pointing to map #1). So that you can see it a
little better; so that I can point out the various lines and geographic
features to greater advantage, I have had this other map prepared
(pointing to map #2) which is on a much larger scale, and shows the same
areas as you see in that square (pointing to square on map #1). The
small scale map I had prepared for the purpose of orienting the few
people who don't even know where Trieste is -- (there are probably some
here -- I never saw an audience yet where there weren't) as to its
general location.
Now this (pointing to map #2) is the same area that you used to see
up in that square (pointing to Trieste area on map #1). This is the
pre-World War II boundary between Jugoslavia and Italy (pointing to
line). This is where Italy's boundary was before World War I (pointing
to line of map #2). This is where all the great Italian fighting took
place -- up in this valley (pointing to Isonzo Valley on map #2); and
the portion between these two red lines in Venezia Giulia.
It was Italy's reward for the part she played in World War I. The
battlecry in those days was "Trento e Trieste!", and Trento e Trieste,
and Venezia Giulia, was what she got, and it meant a great deal to her.
This red arrow indicates the location of the city of Trieste, which
is certainly the most important and significant part of the territory,
but not all of it, by any means.
Obviously, the Jugoslavs couldn't be permitted to get away with this
coup, although they were our allies and had fought a good and effective
war of their own kind. They had failed to carry out a course of action
to which they had definitely committed themselves to.
Also, we had some obligations to Italy, who had received assurances
that if she 'worked her passage' (as the saying went) Great Britain and
the United States would at least keep in a position (without any
promises, they would keep in a position) to give her back her whole
country if the peace conference happened to so decide.
Venezia Giulia, as I have said, was more than just a piece of
territory to the Italians. It was a badge of honor -- a sort of Mecca
and Holy Grail. They had sacrificed over half a million lives for this
little piece of territory, for which they had yearned for centuries.
Italia Irredenta - "Italy Unredeemed,"!
You can't appreciate the tremendous emotional feeling of Italians
about this place, unless you have lived there for a while. It doesn't
bear any relation to anything sensible, of an economic or business
nature. The port wasn't worth a nickel to either side in this
controversy, really, as an economic factor. It is just a thing which
meant prestige and honor and importance to both of them; which they both
wanted primarily for that reason, and still want, and which may still be
the center of another controversy, or the which beginning of another
war.
Anyhow, we had to do something about it. I don't mean me; I wasn't
even in on the conferences. I didn't even know then, that the problem
of military government was coming up in any special form in this area.
But Mr. Tito and Field Marshal Alexander, and General Morgan, who was
Chief of Staff, AFHQ, and his G-5, had some meetings, and there were
extended conferences and, eventually, I am certain, some ultimata -- as
a result of which the Jugoslavs were induced to move back out of Trieste
to this blue line, commonly called the "Morgan Line", because General
Sir William D. Morgan, who later became theater commander (and is now
the head of the British Military Mission in Washington) was the man who
negotiated it.
There are various possible reasons why the line was chosen. There
had to be a line, and it had to be out of Trieste. There was a fair
excuse for it being here, by reason of the fact that a road ran along
this river (pointing to the Isonzo valley) and we could say that we
might want to use that road in order to carry supplies to Austria. Any
way, that was the line that was established.
In addition, because there was a very nice little Italian naval port
down here (and the British, of course, were greatly concerned about
naval things in the Mediterranean) we insisted on taking over Pola. It
was very difficult to administer. It could be reached only by some of
these narrow roads from Trieste (pointing to map) -- about 125
kilometers through Jugoslav territory. Allied personnel had to follow
one road and one road only, which road was, I would say, deliberately
allowed to deteriorate at least as fast as the forces of nature would
cause it to deteriorate, so that a trip from Trieste to Pola became a
nightmare after about six months.
Anyway, that was the show: The Morgan Line with the Jugoslavs to the
east, and British and American forces to the west -- again I point out
to you: both facing north so that they weren't theoretically confronting
each other at all -- the line was just a lateral boundary between
armies.
It was agreed that the troops which happened to be on either side of
that line would fall under the general command in the area where they
were, so that if there were any British or American troops to the east
of the blue line, they would fall under Tito's command, and if there
were any Jugoslav troops to the west of the line, they fell under
British-American command.
Well, there weren't any British or American troops on the east side
of that line, so none of our soldiers ever worked directly for Tito.
It is, however, an interesting fact which is not, I think, generally
realized, that there were a very considerable number of Jugoslav troops
on the west side of the line -- 5,000 of them to be exact -- located
around in here (pointing to map) -- Slovene country, where everyone
spoke their language, which none of us could speak.
The number was later reduced to 2,500, but these 2,500 troops never
left that area. They were there all the time -- even while you were
reading in the paper (that is, those of you who weren't overseas at the
time) that we might be going to war with Jugoslavia any minute.
Right up to the ratification of the Italian peace treaty they worked
for us. They were troops, under General Harding's command, just
like any other allied troops. They were serviced, inspected, and, in
general, treated like any other allied detachments. Colonel Bencic,
their commander, came to the cocktail parties, the troops came into
Trieste on leave, and actually they gave very little trouble.
This was true also during the period I will mention later, in 1946,
when there was a very definite conviction, on the part of many people
who had reason to know, that we might very shortly be engaged in armed
combat with their nation.
The compromise settlement which provided for the Morgan Line also
included agreements about the nature of the civil administration. The
Jugoslavs claimed to have set up a complete system of administration in
the area we took over, and we undertook to use such portions of this as
proved efficient. Neither party was to do anything that might prejudice
the final disposition of the territory. Civil rights were to be uniform
for all races and parties on both sides of the line.
As soon as it became apparent that Venezia Giulia was not to revert
automatically to the Italian Government, the decision was made, on our
side, to divorce the territory from Venice Region, and to treat it as a
separate project. There was created 'Allied Military Government,
Venezia Giulia'; or (as it was called in those days) 'Allied Military
Government 13 Corps', after the 13 Corps, commanded by Sir John Harding,
which included all the British and American troops is the area.
In June 1945, I was ordered up from Bologna to take charge of the
military government in the area.
The first job, tackled as usual, was public safety. The only police
force when we arrived was the Difesa Popolare -- People's Defense,
so-called -- organized by the Jugoslav. It consisted of a band of
ex-partisan soldiers, completely without police training or effective
discipline, who had rendered valuable fighting service but whose
behavior had not tended to calm the nerves of a badly-scared people.
This police force, during the 40 days of Jugoslav administration,
had arrested and deported to Jugoslavia more than 3,000 people, most of
whom were never heard from again. Many of them were undoubtedly bad
fascists, but others were certainly guilty of nothing more than getting
in the way of a policeman, or being Italian.
The Difesa Popolare was abolished - forced to turn in its arms at a
stand-down parade. That meant we got up a big show, paraded the
partisan soldiers, made speeches, led them past some empty trucks, had
three or four people in the parade primed to say "Let's throw away our
guns and get back to the farm!" and, being the good sheep that most of
those people are over there, they followed. The guns were thrown in the
trucks and the trucks were driven away very rapidly.
Wherever that was done in the early days of the occupation in
northern Italy, and even over here in Trieste (where the situation was
reinforced a little bit by having lots of military spectators around) it
never failed to work. We didn't get all of the weapons, but we got at
least a weapon per person, in general. They probably had more left, but
we did the best we could, and certainly accomplished something. I was
very skeptical about that trick when it was proposed, but I can testify
that it worked, and it even worked in Trieste.
In place of the Difesa Popolare, and also in place of the
Carabinieri, and Municipal Guards, and all the traditional Italian
police who had 'flown the coop' completely when Tito came in, we set up
a modern police force of our own, modeled after an American or British
police force. The top officers were, and still are, British and
American.
The strength of the force grew during the next two years from zero
to 6,000, or about one policeman for every 50 people, which is a lot of
policemen. It was a lot when we were administering the entire area up
to the Austrian border. Never having participated in the administration
of the Free Territory, as such, I can still visualize what it must still
be, with those policemen still crowded in this little area -- one for
every 50 men, women, and children.
But of course we had a special problem to meet, and that was the
only way we could meet it.
Now the force is, unquestionably, one of the best in Europe -- far
ahead, because of its training under American and British officers, in
the fields of scientific crime detection, radio inter-communication, mob
control, and other modern branches of police work.
The next problem was employment -- bringing about the employment, at
first in public works and later in normal industries -- of thousands of
jobless men. Repairs to damaged industrial facilities, housing, and the
devastated port, were needed at once. It was necessary, also, to
establish a stable public psychology, to destroy the outward signs of
war -- the pillboxes, gun emplacements, and air raid shelters. Had you
ever been faced with the problem of destroying those things under direct
orders from a high-ranking British general, without having anything to
destroy them with but knives and forks, you can appreciate my feelings
during those early days in the summer of 1945.
We got the tools after a while, and we did destroy them. Meanwhile,
we literally crawled over them, in some cases, with knives and forks. I
had to put on a show of activity, and try, even before I had the stuff
to try with.
Jobs were needed primarily, however, to keep the people quiet -- as
expressed in AMG Charter from Salerno north -- to 'prevent disease and
unrest' -- the unrest part of which, of course, applied with special
force up here. There were many delays, caused chiefly by the shortage
of raw materials, coal to make bricks (One of the first things you learn
as a civil affairs officer, is that the most important component of a
brick is coal. I had never realized that before.) -- cement, steel, and
bitumen for roads. These came in time. The public works payroll
eventually reached 20,000 persons and then scaled off, with the revival
of normal business and the approaching end of the operation.
Programs of imports were worked out, and these needs were,
throughout the operation, supplied throughout military channels. Venezia
Giulia was the one place in Europe where UNRRA [United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Agency(?)] never operated, although it was one of the
most important UNRRA ports in Europe. Supplies came in for Jugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. We were tickled to death to get
the business, but we never got any UNRRAQ supplies ourselves.
It was only after these basic economic problems were on the way to
solution, that we turned our attention to the form of local government.
Those of you who have read FM 27-10 and probably even 27-5 (as I
think you should) will know that one of the elementary rules of land
warfare is that an occupying power must, as far as possible, maintain
local institutions as it finds them.
What were these 'local institutions' -- 'the laws in effect' -- in
the summer of 1945 in Venezia Giulia?
At first blush you would say, unquestionably, the Italian
Constitutional system, in effect (subject to some fascist trimmings)
from the Treaty of Peace following World War I.
The Jugoslavs and communists denied this. "The people held
elections on May 18", they said, "while the Jugoslav Army was here. They
abolished the old forms of government. They elected a new revolutionary
government -- 'Councils of Liberation' -- and vested all power in these
councils. They are operating efficiently. These are the 'institutions
in force', and we insist that you recognize them."
The communists offered full collaboration if we took this course.
The officials who call on me were extremely quiet, reasonable, and
restrained. Their protestations and remarks to me were, in general,
characterized by understatement. They were exceptionally fine
ambassadors. When I asked to see representatives of the other side, no
one spoke up. The Italians were all under cover, scared to death after
the "40 days".
It seemed possible on the surface that the Councils of Liberation,
which were admittedly communist and pro-Slav, really did represent the
people.
I should point out that being 'pro-communist' and 'pro-Slav' didn't
necessarily go together in this area. For general purposes, in a short
presentation, you have to assume that they did, but there were lots of
pro-communist Italians, and still are (and, of course, now it is
complicated by having two kinds of communists - the Tito and Stalin
communist) but never, at any time, did the ideological and ethnical
lines exactly coincide. There were always some pro-communist Italians
and the were lots of anti-communist Jugoslavs.
The lines shifted, depending on the subject - on the particular
problem. You had to be constantly aware of these shifts. Otherwise,
when you're dealing with a group that seemed to be in the minority, in a
particular matter you'd find out that they were in the majority, which
might create considerable trouble if you weren't properly advised, and
weren't ready for it.
The elections, I learned, had consisted of alleged meetings of
members of unions, crafts, and professions, followed by a large
convention of representatives of these groups in buildings guarded by
Jugoslav soldiers.
You will remember that, under our agreement with Tito, existing
institutions were to be preserved if they proved efficient. We
were able to conclude conscientiously that they had not.
We also felt that, despite appearances, most of the people didn't
want these little Soviets to run their community. I convinced myself
that the 'legislative intent' of the parties to the Hague Convention was
not that a 25-day-old revolutionary government, even if it were bona
fide, should be considered the "laws in effect", in preference to a
quarter-century-old constitutional system, even though one somewhat
smeared by Fascism.
In the end we adopted the Italian scheme, stripped of Mussolini's
Fascist trimmings, and with a new nomenclature.
We set up three areas: one at Gorizia (pointing to map) which later
became headquarters of the famous 88th Division, one at Trieste
(pointing to map) and one down at Pola (pointing to map). Each of these
towns had been a provincial capital before the war, and we took over the
machinery as we found it there, changed the names of some of the offices
to give them a somewhat more democratic flavor, took complete control
ourselves, (so that, of course, the situation was basically as
completely undemocratic as military government is bound to be) -- to
make it a little more palatable took to doing certain things in two
languages, and so on, and went on from there in much the same fashion
that the Italian government had been conducted before.
All of this scheme of government was expressed, in its essence, in
General Order No. 11, which also provided that no body other than those
established by it, would exercise any governmental power. This was the
first definite notice to the Jugoslavs that we were no longer
recognizing their so-called 'institutions' as governmental entities.
I have posted a copy of General Order No. 11 in the lobby. You
might have noticed it as you came in, as it was posted in and about
Trieste in three languages in 3 parallel columns: English, Italian, and
Slovene.
Both sides vigorously attacked this order - the Italians because we
had not adopted the Italian scheme intact, as in the rest of Italy - the
communists and pro-Slavs because we had, as they said, acted
"anti-democratically" against "the people's will" - using the same
familiar phrases which were familiar only to us then, but which you have
all heard since in news bulletins from everywhere in the world. As
propaganda, those words were no doubt invented long ago, but they were
first used generally, I think, in the Trieste area. In any event, we
stuck by our guns, decided to make General Order No. 11 stick, and we
did make it stick.
We were unsuccessful in getting very many Slovenes to serve in the
government. We planned to even things up that way but most of them had
communist commitments and were afraid to serve under us, so we finally
had to supply most of our personnel needs from the Italian side. Most
of the administrative talent was Italian in any event, which wasn't
entirely to Italy's credit because, unquestionably, under Fascism, it
had been very difficult for anyone who wasn't Italian, either actually
or professedly, to gain any training, experience, or even education.
The most spectacular aspects of the next two years in and about
Trieste are, I think, familiar to you. We used to groan when we read
clippings from the United States, which always related to incidents of
violence: demonstrations, bombings, and public disorder. Now these
things certainly happened, but I must tell any of you who think of
Trieste and Palestine as comparable situations, that during the first 6
months of the Allied administration in Trieste -- a period of almost
daily demonstrations, strikes, and the like -- not a single life was
lost in any public disorder.
Actually, we devoted 75 percent of our effort to economic
rehabilitation -- not only to make jobs, as I pointed out -- but also to
prepare the Territory for its undetermined future role in world affairs.
Now we were definitely limited in what we could do along those
lines. Remember, I said our charter was to 'prevent disease and
unrest', and that was pretty strictly construed at times. When we tried
to do some things which would extend into the indefinite future and be
of permanent benefit to the Territory, we were very often caught short
by a strict interpretation of that charter. Within its limits (and it
did expand and contract in accordance with the exigencies of the
situation) we did the best we could, and I don't think that any
comparable geographic area ever had such a "face-lifting" in such a
short time.
The port, the industrial facilities, and the city itself, were
rebuilt; forests were planted on the hills; every road in the Territory
was resurfaced at least once, during the two years. [All] of the
bridges destroyed by war (and those of you who followed the Germans know
that that meant every bridge whether it is worth anything militarily or
not) were all repaired -- every single one -- or on the way, by the
summer of 1947.
All of this was done against unremitting efforts by the communists
to discredit us, and with something less than full cooperation by the
Italians.
Our policy included the maintenance of a local press completely free
in fact as well as in theory. This freedom included the right to
criticise us, and I suppose that no government administration anywhere
ever had to 'take it' quite as badly as we did at that time. I was
better known than anyone else to the people of the area and caught most
of the cross-fire personally.
I didn't mind it too much. There were a lot of humorous aspects to
the battle of the local press. Colonel Skelly knows even more about
that than I do. He was there and read the stuff; it was his business to
read it. I read such of it as I could, and then went on with the job.
If you kept your perspective, it was good fun.
Now there are many people whose opinions I respect who feel that
this policy of permitting unrestricted press criticism was a mistake.
From the standpoint of an officer acting, as I was, at a relatively low
level, it wouldn't have made any difference whether it was right or
wrong, because I did what I was told to do, as every soldier does on the
operating level.
However, I wasn't aware at the time that our policy in other places
was somewhat different, and I felt then, and feel now, that we did the
right thing in Trieste. It was a special situation; the people in
Trieste never really participated in the war to any great extent; they
were really liberated. The Germans had planned to incorporate the area
into Germany. Remember it had been Austria only thirty years before and
there was a perfectly logical case for bringing it back into Austria,
which meant back into Germany.
We believed in freedom of the press ourselves, which is neither here
nor there perhaps. We were strong, our critics were weak. We could
afford to sit back and let the criticism spend itself, and we did.
Although everyone didn't agree with that, at all times, we let them
shout their heads off in the newspapers, and I think it was right.
The communist tactics of disorder took many forms, and were hard to
counter. The institution of the 'funeral' was one of the worst: the
business of digging up bodies of 'Partisan heroes' and carrying them for
reburial by the longest possible route to new locations. it was
troublesome to deal with, since it is almost impossible to "suppress" a
funeral, yet any procession was likely to result in violence. Heavy
police guards, and careful routing, specified in the permit and rigidly
enforced, constituted the best solution we had.
As these things grew in numbers, we divided the city into two parts
roughly -- set one part aside for communist and pro-Slav demonstrations,
and one for Italian demonstrations. The line in between these two parts
sometimes, in imitation of the 'Morgan Line', was called the "Bowman
Line" and this was the source of some more good fun during that
operation. It didn't last very long; we found other ways to beat the
'spontaneous demonstrations' game.
The political strike with the "economic" excuse, repeated over and
over again, was treated by standing fast and ignoring it -- a treatment
which always worked -- in every case. A favorite battleground in the
heart of the city, with ready-made ammunition in the form of cubic,
razor-edged, baseball-size paving blocks, was deprived of its usefulness
by repaving it with asphalt. Each form of sabotage had to be countered
as it occurred by some expedient suitable to the occasion.
As time went on, the same AMG personnel remained in the saddle, and
it gradually became clear to both sides that we were not making our own
rules, but were merely following orders, the invective of our local
critics was diverted gradually (not by us, but somewhat to our relief)
to our respective governments.
In the spring of 1946, a commission of the Council of Foreign
Ministers visited the territory with instructions to establish an ethnic
line suitable for a new boundary between Italy and Jugoslavia. In July,
1946, the decision was announced. The Commission had complied with its
instructions, but had also recommended, in addition, the establishment
of a new state -- the Trieste Free Territory -- unfortunately cut
entirely out of territory on the Italian side of the ethnic line. This
green line is the so-called ethnic (pointing to map) or 'French' Line.
It was a pretty good job, so far as putting most of the Italians on
one side and most of the Slavs on the other, was concerned; it was a
fair compliance with the instructions which the commissioners brought
with them to Trieste. But this additional act of cutting, entirely out
of the Italian side, this little Free Territory has caused lots of
trouble, and will cause more. There is a lot to be said for and against
the line itself, also, but it is not appropriate for me to discuss it,
nor have I time.
The announcement of this decision, in July 1946, touched off the
most violent period of the administration, including a long general
strike, complicated by riots. Early in July, participants in an
'all-Italy bicycle race' were attacked from ambush when they entered
Venezia Giulia, carrying small Italian flags. When word reached
Trieste, gangs of Italian hoodlums attacked every building in the city
housing Jugoslavs, communists, or supporters of the Independence
Movement. They also looted and burned the Slovene language book stores,
most of which were anti-communist and were actually used for the
dissemination of our own 'psychological' literature.
Every non-communist Italian during this period became a "fascist" to
the Slavs, and the Italians relearned the old habit of contemptuously
hissing the word "Schiava" which means "Slav".
It was the roughest time we had.
After 12 days, the strike, like all the other strikes, fell of its
own weight, with no concessions. Violence continued, but tapered off.
We met communist-inspired disorder in the shipyards by taking them over
ourselves, but retained control for only about two weeks, and then
turned them back. Things quieted down, and while there was "never a
dull moment", the problems for the rest of the period were less
spectacular and violent.
Most of the rest of my time in Trieste was devoted to planning for
the Free Territory, and the turnover to Italy and Jugoslavia of portions
of the occupied area not to be included in the Free Territory. Our
policy was to make both sides accept an accomplished fact, no matter how
disagreeable. In this the pro-Jugoslavs became much more cooperative,
probably realizing that they won much of what they wanted, and hoping to
get the rest by the familiar technique of "boring from within" the new
political framework.
The Italians were more violent. They had more to lose. Every step
toward carrying out the decision of the Peace Conference they treated as
a personal affront, and certainly they did deserve much sympathy. The
evacuation of Pola, that little naval base down at the tip of Istria,
was the most critical single problem. It began right after the treaty
was signed on February 10 [1946] (on which date a fanatic, ex-fascist
Italian woman shot and killed the British Garrison commander on the
parade ground).
Nevertheless, Pola was evacuated. Four-fifths of its Italian people
abandoned the soil which they had occupied for centuries -- not because
they legally had to, but because they could or would not live on
non-Italian soil, or had seen too much of Jugoslav rule during the '40
days'.
Meanwhile, R-Day (the day on which the treaty was to be ratified),
R-J-Day (the day when the Jugoslavs, as such, would ratify), G-Day (the
day when the Governor of the Free Territory might be expected to arrive)
- each was estimated, postponed, reestimated, and re-postponed. R-Day
and R-J-Day finally arrived simultaneously, on September 15, 1947.
"G-Day" has never happened.
The Governor provided for in the treaty has not yet been designated,
though more than two years have passed since the treaty and many
candidates have been considered. Five thousand of our troops, which the
treaty said should stay there until 90 days after the Governor took
over, are still there, and probably will be for some time.
Italy and Jugoslavia face each other across a new boundary which has
been much discussed. I don't desire to add my conjectures. I merely
point out that that Free Territory is still a political fact, although
it is governed by the Allied Military Commanders whose troops are
stationed there. The most important aspect of that, to my mind, is the
fact that the Morgan Line is still in existence. This little bit of the
Morgan Line (pointing to map) which formerly went all the way up to
Austria, still cuts right straight across this Free Territory which was
intended to be an independent and homogeneous creature of the United
Nations. That situation will likewise continue until the troops are
withdrawn, which, as I say, is not likely to happen.
For 18 months now, the Western Three of what used to be called 'The
Big Four', have been urging upon Russia a revision of the Peace Treaty
which would provide for the return of the Free Territory area to Italy.
This isn't a military government subject, and I mention it merely to
remind you that the officers, men, and civilians of the Army, and the
other instrumentalities of our government who are now carrying on the
military government in the Trieste Free Territory, confront an entirely
new set of circumstances than we faced in my time. Their charter is
based on the Italian Peace Treaty, not on belligerent occupation, and
their administration has reflected, and will continue to reflect, the
changing currents of world affairs, as evidenced, for example, by the
tri-partite proposal for the return of Trieste to Italy.
The future of Trieste will, however, depend less on their efforts
than on the eventual resolution of the same general broad problems which
will determine. along the long line from Scandinavia to the Adriatic,
whether the west and the east, in general, can get along, and work with
each other.
I think that some of us here may play an active part in the solution
of that problem. ...