Civil Affairs and Military Government
in the Mediterranean Theater

Robert W Komer

Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army [1948]

Forward (pp. i-iii)

   During World War II the U.S. Army exercised responsibility of civil affairs and military government on an unprecedented scale. Within the world-wide scope of Army operations in liberated and occupied territory, the Mediterranean theater had a special significance. It was in this theater that the U.S. Army first encountered major problems of civil affairs in military government (CA/MG); here it tested traditional doctrine against the realities of total warfare, made necessary modifications, and developed policies and techniques which were later applied in other areas. CA/MG operations in the Mediterranean theater were also of peculiar interest because they included a joint military government instituted in Sicily with the Allied military government and then extended to mainland Italy, which was unusual, if not unprecedented in the degree to which the parties, the United States and Great Britain, integrated their personnel and responsibilities. In addition the history of the theater includes examples of virtually all the major forms of CA/MG; almost complete delegation of administration to civilian agencies as in North Africa; direct military government as established in Sicily; the combination of military government with armistice control as instituted later in mainland Italy; primary reliance upon indigenous authorities as in southern France; the assumption of civil affairs authority merely in matters of relief and rehabilitation as in the Balkans; and participation in the complex enterprise of quadripartite control as in Austria.

   This work is concerned with the Mediterranean Theater of Operations from the point of view of the staff section at Allied Force Headquarters for CA/MG, which was known successively as the Civil Affairs Section, the Military Government Section, and G-5. It is based with some exceptions only on records which were available only at AFHQ and thus does not reflect in great detail the history of lower echelons. The study is focused principally upon high-level policy and basic issues of administration - matters which called for solution by the theater commander and his staff section because they were of major importance and gave to operations their general pattern.

   The lack of any similar Army historical study of a CA/MG staff section of a major theater is responsible for the decision to make available to Army schools a study which is incomplete and preliminary. Because of the advantages of early issuance, the Office of the Chief of Military History has not followed its ordinary practice with first narratives of filling in all their omissions and of checking systematically upon their accuracy. However, the Civil Affairs Section of the Office of the Chief of Military History, which is preparing a two-volume series on civil affairs and military government for THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, has added to the work such additional materials as were already available, including a chapter on epuration in Italy which was prepared by Harold Epstein of that section.

   The original manuscript was prepared under the direction of Col. E. D. Salmon, Theater Historian MTOUSA, by Capt. Robert W. Komer, who was assisted in a portion of the work by 1st Lt. Alexander H. Warner. It has been revised to the extent that time permitted by Dr. Albert K. Weinberg, Chief of the Civil Affairs Section. Many helpful suggestions were made by Col. Archelaus L. Hamblen, Assistant to the Deputy to the Undersecretary of the Department of the Army, who, during the latter part of Allied Control in Italy, was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 AFHQ. Col. Alfred C. Bowman, formerly Senior Civil Affairs Officer of XIII Corps in Venezia Giulia, added materials to the chapter concerned with that area and made suggestions regarding other chapters on northern Italy. The manuscript was given final editing by Mrs. Frances T. Fritz of the Editorial Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Chapter XIV
Northern Italy (pp. XIV.29-XIV.34)

The South Tyrol

   The South Tyrol, comprising the three provinces of Belluno, Trento, and Bolzano, had been ceded to Italy by Austria in 1919. After the Italian surrender in September 1943, the Germans had restored a German administration. Fearing difficulties with the preponderantly German-speaking population, AC [Allied Commission] requested guidance on the South Tyrol when it began to plan for northern Italy. AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters] directed AC to inform the Italian Government that AMG [Allied Military Government] would be maintained in Bolzano and Trento until their status had been settled by the peace treaty [signed on 10 February 1947; came into force on 15 September 1947]. Since that directive did not preclude this course, AC proposed to restore Belluno to the Italian Government as soon as possible. In Trento, the population of which, like that at Belluno, was largely Italians, AC planned to restore the Italian administrative system with AMG supervision as in Venezia Giulia. Bolzano Province, however, raised a problem; 80 percent of the population of 277,000 were German-speaking, from 65 to 80 percent were of German origin, and most of those were closely attached to Austrian tradition. The majority could be expected to view the return of Italian law and administration with disfavor. Therefore, while proposing that German officials be replaced by local inhabitants, AC requested guidance from AFHQ as to whether civil administration should follow German or Italian lines. G-5 replied that while no definite plans could be made until the [UK] Foreign Office and the [US] State Department expressed their views; it believed that the import of Italian officials should be avoided but that the civil government of Bolzano should be reconstituted along Italian rather than Austro-German lines. It added that, since the province would probably not be detached from Italy, AMG policy should not encourage separatist hopes. AMG might, however, allow local self-government in anticipation of a proviso in the peace treaty for protection of German minority rights.

   In April 1945 the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff] directed that AMG be maintained in Bolzano until the peace treaty. After the German surrender Bolzano was outwardly quiet but local AMG officers were convinced that the Austrian population would strongly oppose any return to prewar conditions; they believed in any case that the ultimate disposition of the area should be settled as soon as practicable to forestall political tension and remove an obstacle to economic recovery. AC considered it undesirable to retain AMG in any part of northern Italy except Venezia-Giulia unless there were over-riding military reasons, and it saw none in the case of Bolzano. Agreeing with this view, AFHQ recommended to the CCS that Bolzano be restored to Italian jurisdiction at the same time as the rest of northern Italy. It pointed out that as the frontier touched Switzerland and Allied-occupied Austria there was little likelihood of external aggression or of any internal separatist movement with which the Italian Government could not deal. AC informed the Italian Prime Minister of this recommendation, but warned that any return of Bolzano would be without prejudice to its final disposition.

   While the State Department had previously advised that it would not object to restoration of Bolzano if the theater [AFHQ] considered AMG no longer necessary, in October 1945 Secretary of State Byrnes suggested that Bolzano remain under AMG lest it prejudice the settlement of the question in the peace treaty and weaken the Allied position in Venezia-Giulia. AFHQ, warned by AC that this reversal of policy might have an unfortunate effect on the Italian Government and public, strongly urged that Bolzano be restored as planned. The CCS acceded to the representations of AFHQ and directed on 8 December [1945] that Bolzano as well as Belluno and Trento be restored to Italian jurisdiction at the same time as the remainder of northern Italy. AFHQ, however, was to inform the Italian Government and also to announce publicly that this transfer was without prejudice to any frontiers rectifications which might be made in the peace treaty.

Udine

   Another area where the conflict between political and military factors complicated its restoration to Italian administration was Udine Province. Udine Province before 1919 formed part of Austrian Carinthia. While it was conceivable that Austria might seek its return, theater planning had contemplated treating Udine the same as any other Italian area, with restoration to the Italian Government after the usual initial period of AMG.

   But in April 1945 the CCS directed that AMG be maintained in the town of Tarvisio and surrounding parts of Udine until the peace treaty. Its reason was not political but military. Tarvisio was of military importance to the Allies not only because it was a part of the line of communication to Austria but also because it was the only [other] area where the Italian frontiers touched Yugoslavia, with which there was current difficulty over Venezia Giulia. The Political Advisers to AC took the view that it would be politically undesirable to retain any part of Udine under AMG and recommended that the entire province be returned at the same time as the remainder of northern Italy. On the other hand the Regional Commissioner urged that the restoration be delayed. He pointed out that Udine was a particularly unsettled area, containing a considerable number of Yugoslav and Italian pro-Yugoslav Partisans, and that normal Italian administration had not yet been sufficiently well organized to be effective. AC, having balanced these views, proposed that the CCS be requested to allow restoration of Udine Province by 1 December, when the local Italian administration would be much stronger.

   Military considerations, however, led AFHQ to determine to keep Udine indefinitely under AMG. First, the delicate situation in Venezia Giulia required that Allied Forces be disposed semi-operationally and be capable of deployment on short notice; since the narrow Allied zone in Venezia Giulia did not allow sufficient depth for this purpose, retention of full military control in the adjoining province of Udine was essential. Second, to maintain quiet conditions in northeastern Italy it was desirable to avoid direct frontier contact between the Italian and Yugoslav administrations. Finally, it was necessary to safeguard the line of communication through Udine into the British zone in Austria, especially in view of the danger of further trouble with the Yugoslavs. Consequently AFHQ requested the CCS to approve the retention of AMG in Udine until further notice. In December 1945 the CCS authorized retention of Udine until the peace treaty, but directed AMG to notify the Italian Government and to announce publicly that it was retained solely for military reasons and not because Udine was considered a disputed region.

Chapter XV
The Occupation of Venezia Giulia (pp. XV.1-XV.17)

   Both in planning for northern Italy and in its occupation the Allies faced a special problem in the disputed region of Venezia Giulia, claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. This region of 3,369 squares miles, which included the Istrian Peninsula and the Port of Trieste, had a population of about one million. The population of the coastal towns was principally Italian, but the country in general was marked by a mixture of national groups in which Italians and Slovenes were predominant. The Allies wished Venezia Giulia to be controlled by AMG until the peace treaty. This course would insure that the ultimate disposition of the area would not be prejudiced by prior measures of either Italians or Yugoslavs. At the same time Allied military government was dictated by the Allied military interest in the area, arising from the fact that Trieste and the railways formed the line of communication to the projected British occupation zone in Austria.

   Achievement of these two Allied objectives was threatened by the annexationist aims of Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communist regime. Even during the German occupation, Yugoslav Partisans had established in the area a strong underground organization. It appeared likely that upon German collapse or withdrawal the Yugoslavs might occupy the area before Allied troops could arrive, and AFHQ's misgivings became still greater when repeated attempts to secure Yugoslav agreement to the establishment of AMG throughout Venezia Giulia failed. The delicacy of the issue was apparent to AMG at an early stage and in consequence military government planning for Venezia Giulia was separated from the planning for northern Italy in general.

Planning for Venezia Giulia

   Early in August 1944, as a guide to future planning, AC inquired about the territorial limits within which AMG administration would be established when the Italian frontiers were reached, particularly in Venezia Giulia. Should the line of demarcation be the old Italian-Yugoslav frontier, the actual line where the Allied forces met Yugoslav forces, or some other line, historic or ad hoc?(1) Experience had shown that the de facto situation existing while a peace treaty was being negotiated would have a potent effect on its outcome. G-5 suggested seeking a decision from the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff]. The Chief of Staff and the two Political Advisors considered it unwise to raise the frontier question at this stage and suggested that G-5 plan for military government in all Italian areas which Allied forces might enter.
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(1) The view of the Department of State was that AFHQ should extend AMG to the 1939 frontier and that no military forces other than Anglo-American troops (through AMG) should be permitted to administer Italian metropolitan territory lest its final disposition be prejudiced.
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    At a meeting of General [Henry Maitland] Wilson [Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED)] with Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Subasic of the Royal Yugoslav Government at Caserta on 13 August 1944, agreement was reached that in the event of Allied forces occupying northeastern Italy, Austria, or Hungary, the Yugoslav Commander in Chief would place at the Allies' disposal all facilities under Yugoslav control which were necessary to the maintenance of his forces and the security of his line of communication. Tito also agreed in principle that in this event the Allied forces should occupy Trieste and the line of communication to Austria. An issue arose, however, when General Wilson stated that in the event Allied forces occupied the disputed areas of northeastern Italy he intended to establish AMG up to the 1939 frontier and to keep the area under direct Allied administration until its disposition was settled. Both Tito and Subasic demurred at this announcement and stated that they would submit a memorandum of their views. The Italian government was also concerned over the status of this area. On 15 August the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs called the attention of ACC [Allied Control Commission] to the possibility of unfortunate incidents when Venezia Giulia was liberated and expressed the hope that the Allies would take adequate precautions. AFHQ directed ACC to inform the Italian Government, as SACMED had already informed Tito, that the Allies would maintain AMG in Venezia Giulia until the peace treaty.

   Because of the complexity of the problem, ACC requested guidance on planning for the disputed frontier areas, especially on the question of using Italian local officials, courts, and carabinieri. Their use was normal under AMG, but ACC feared that resentment among the Slav population would result if Italian officials were retained. Since it appeared likely that Venezia Giulia would be under the control of both Croat and Italian Partisans by the time Allied forces could arrive, G-5 concluded that the most practical course, least subject to the charge of favoritism, would be the retention of whatever local officials were in control, whether Slovenes[sic?] or Croats, Partisans on non-Partisans, with the exception of officials who had served under the Germans. It would be advisable, however to establish military courts and to recruit a local civil police.

   In October 1944 ACC submitted to AFHQ a plan for AMG in Venezia Giulia. The planners saw practical advantages in proceeding along familiar administrative lines while at the same time making appropriate adaptations to local conditions to insure impartial administration. Therefore, ACC proposed that AMG follow the pattern established elsewhere in Italy but make it clear from the outset that the Allies would remain until the peace settlement. AC also recommended a number of special measures to insure impartial administration:

      1. Maintenance of the status quo - Italian or Slav, Partisan or non-Partisan - insofar as a responsible administration responsive to local public opinion was found on Allied entry. Only indigenous officials would be retained or permitted in office.

      2. Restraint in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops. Special police would be recruited locally, but it might be necessary to supplement them with allied troops on a relatively large scale because of the difficult situation and the importance of the area as the Allied line of communication to Austria.

      3. Use of Italian basic law except for suspension of all laws discriminating against the Yugoslavs, elimination of the right of recourse beyond local courts, and exclusion of certain Italian legislation.

      4. Similar development of a degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters. Italian lire would continue to be legal tender but new currency would be AM [Allied Military] lire.

      5. Formation from indigenous Italians and Slavs of local advisory committees which the Allied regional authorities could consult at their discretion. AC decided to treat Venezia Giulia as part of the Venezia Region rather than to establish separate administrative machinery which might create the impression of a fait accompli.

   ACC envisaged three alternative situations upon Allied entry:
(1) Partisan control would still not have crystallized;
(2) local Partisans would have assumed control; or
(3) part of the regular Yugoslav force would have entered and established military government.
The third contingency would present the greatest difficulty. Since the commander of any regular Yugoslav invading army would automatically become military governor of occupied territory he would probably have set up a Yugoslav administration, which would have the sanction of the law of belligerent occupation. It would be extremely difficult if not wholly impolitic of AMG officers to attempt to displace such administration or to superimpose AMG on it. To insure a transition to AMG, ACC recommended seeking an agreement with the Yugoslav authorities that any Yugoslav forces which crossed the 1939 frontier into Italy would operate as an expeditionary force under Allied command.

   Headquarters Allied Armies In Italy [AAI, same as 15th Army Group] not only considered it essential to military operations that the Allies control Trieste and Fiume and the road and rail lines radiating from these cities but believed that extension of AMG to the 1939 frontier was essential to such control. Therefore AAI also urged prompt negotiations with Tito to secure agreement on the plans. G-5 favored negotiations but the American ambassador raised the objection that the issues were political rather than military and should therefore be dealt with on a governmental level. Consequently, in late November 1944, AFHQ raised the question of the advisability of diplomatic negotiations with the Yugoslavs.

   When an answer was not soon forthcoming AFHQ considered possible alternatives to establishment of AMG. Because of the uncertainty over the political future of Venezia Giulia considerable opposition to the setting up of AMG appeared likely. Tito had objected to this proposal in August 1944, and his attitude, as indicated by recent difficulty in securing his agreement to establishment of an airfield at Zara, had probably become even more uncompromising. Accordingly AMG examined the following questions:
(1) whether it would be possible to supply both American and British zones in Austria over the Brenner Pass route;
(2) if this was impossible, whether efficient operation of a line of communication from Trieste required the establishment of AMG;
(3) if not, whether it was necessary to set up AMG in any part of Venezia Giulia; and
(4) whether Allied military requirements could be met satisfactorily merely by an agreement with Tito, and what such an agreement should cover.

   Field Marshal [Sir Harold] Alexander, the New Supreme Allied Commander [from Nov '44], took the view that no alternative could be adopted which did not guarantee Allied use of the Port of Trieste and the railroads through Venezia Giulia. He considered that control of these facilities was essential to adequate communication with the British zone in Austria and that the Allies must therefore have no option on this line of communication, fully secured and under orderly government. While recognizing that this option might possibly be enjoyed also under Yugoslav control of the area, he considered that any option which prejudiced its ultimate disposition was likely to cause trouble in Italy and to increase the Allied internal security commitment.

   Since Tito was amenable to Soviet influence, SACMED considered that the establishment of a tripartite Anglo-American-Soviet AMG might be the best course. Failing this, SACMED wished to negotiate an agreement with Tito on the basis on the 1914 frontier, providing for absolute Allied control of the port of Trieste and for priority of Allied needs for the portion of the line of communication east of the 1914 frontier. The agreement would have to insure that, whatever government administered the area, the Allies could exercise such control without impediment.

   Thus in February 1945 the theater planners turned to consideration of the possibility of a separate AMG in Venezia Giulia, independent of AC and responsible directly to AFHQ.(2) Since settlement of the question of the line of communication through Trieste and of other outstanding issues was essential to his operational plans, Field Marshal Alexander decided in February 1945 to visit Marshal Tito. Considering that his operational needs should be met regardless of political considerations, Alexander determined to seek a purely military agreement on Venezia Giulia. This had been approved by the British Foreign Secretary during Alexander's conferences with him in London. It was a view dictated by the fact that any Allied administration must be acceptable to Tito, who had Partisan forces in the area and was likely to claim all of the area east of the Isonzo River and also a portion east of the Tagliamento River. Alexander determined to take as his position that, regardless of final political settlement, Trieste and the line of communication to Austria, together with the territory and troops to the west of it, must be under American-British control Specifically he would propose a north-south military boundary running along certain well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the line of communication required by the Allies. The area west of this boundary would be under AMG, but no reference would be made in the agreement as to the type of administration east of the boundary. Alexander would make every effort to induce Tito to withdraw any Yugoslav troops west of the boundary but, if they remained, Tito must agree to their coming under SACMED's command. Similarly, any Allied troops east of the boundary would pass under Tito's command.
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(2) In early September 1944 the Royal Yugoslav member of the Advisory council for Italy had suggested to SACMED that the disputed area be placed under an independent Allied military government. It was that proposal which led G-5 to investigate whether such a special administration might be set up directly under AFHQ. The Germans, who also faced the problem of keeping their Italian and Croat puppet states from each other's throats, had themselves instituted a separate direct local government in Venezia Giulia, staffed largely by Austrian officials and quisling Italians and Slovenes.
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   This plan met strong opposition from the State Department, which held that, desirable as it might be to arrange matters on a military basis, the political implications could not be overlooked. The American Government wished AMG extended to all areas that were a part of Italy in 1939 and objected to any action that might compromise the 1939 frontier. It considered that an agreement such as Field Marshal Alexander proposed might well imply that the Allies were prepared to give a part of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia; in any case it restricted AMG control over all Italian areas.(3) The Allied Commission also objected to the plan of Alexander. Its Deputy President pointed out that the Italian Government, already notified that all of Venezia Giulia would pass to AMG, would consider an implicit invitation to Tito to occupy any Italian territory a breach of the spirit, if not the terms, of the armistice. Mr [Harold] Macmillan, Ex-Officio President of AC [from Oct 44], felt likewise that the proposal might imply the de facto right of the Yugoslavs to that part of Venezia Giulia east of the proposed boundary. He considered that AFHQ would do best to consult the CCS before carrying out the proposal.
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(3) The State Department recognized that if Tito's forces should be the first to occupy Venezia Giulia AMG could not be extended to that area unless and until there was an agreement with Tito. Failing such an agreement it seemed to the State Department necessary to seek support of Allied plans for AMG from the Soviet Union. When tripartite accord on this question had been reached identical notes could be sent to warn the Yugoslav Government not to occupy any territory west of the 1939 frontier. If it should be found that the USSR wished to participate in the military government of Venezia Giulia there should be no objection. The State Department emphasized that American policy was still one of preventing the final disposition of disputed territory from being prejudiced by unilateral action.
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   Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, Deputy CinC Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, suggested still another course. Once a provisional government was established in Yugoslavia, the Allies might point out to it that as one of the United Nations it was a party to the Italian armistice and consequently shared in the Allied responsibility for AMG in Venezia Giulia as in other parts of Italy. Macmillan and [Adm Ellery] Stone [Chief Commissioner of AC and Chief Civil Affairs Officer on SACMED staff] agreed with Air Marshal Slessor that there would be no difficulty appointing a Yugoslav representative to the AC parallel to the existing Soviet representative.

   After considering all these views, Field Marshal Alexander decided that during his visit to Belgrade it would be best to raise the question of Venezia Giulia only in the most general terms. He would not seek any form of agreement but merely endeavor to ascertain Tito's views. Since Tito had already agreed in principle to Allied control of Trieste and the line of communication to Austria, it would be sufficient to inform him that all of Venezia Giulia must come under AMG and that Yugoslav forces in the area must be under Allied command. On the basis of Tito's reaction, SACMED would explain to the CCS the difficulties and suggest the solution proposed by Air Marshal Slessor.

   During his conference with Alexander at the end of February, Marshal Tito accepted the proposal that AMG be established within an Allied line of communication zone. He insisted, however, that the Yugoslav civil administration already installed in this area be retained. Tito argued that otherwise chaos would ensue. As for Allied occupation of the Istrian Peninsula, he claimed that this was not necessary if the purpose of the Allies were merely to protect a line of communication between Trieste and Austria.(4)
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(4) Information obtained over a period of months gave ample evidence that the Yugoslavs intended to extend their hold over as large an area of northeastern Italy as possible in order to claim the maximum amount of territory. East of the Isonzo the influence of the Yugoslav National Army was paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control, and great efforts were being made to extend it so far as the Tagliamento. Italian Partisan brigades were being required to accept this influence as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances considerable internal disorder was likely in northeastern Italy east of the Tagliamento when the Germans withdrew and the Allied entered.
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   AFHQ re-examined the problem in the light of the Belgrade discussions. The Supreme Allied Commander considered that the key to obtaining Tito's agreement to any proposed arrangement for Venezia Giulia was clearly to secure Soviet approval before presenting it to the Yugoslavs. He felt certain that otherwise Tito would not agree to place under Allied control his troops and civil administration in those parts of Venezia Giulia which did not contain communications [lines of communication?] of military importance. Mr. Macmillan therefore agreed with Air Marshal Slessor that the best hope of a solution was the merging of Yugoslav administration with that of AMG. AC also agreed with this view but strongly recommended that administration be placed under an Allied military governor appointed by SACMED, to whom Tito's occupational forces would be subordinate insofar as necessary for enforcing AMG proclamations. This was necessary to insure equitable distribution of civilian supplies and equal treatment of all elements of the population. The Deputy American Political Advisor urged that every step be taken to exclude Tito's civil administration from areas which were essentially Italian. All parties were opposed to a dividing line between eastern and western zones and favored arrangements for placing the entire area under SACMED's control.

   AFHQ concluded that its proposals to the CCS must recognize the dominance of political factors. If operational issues alone had been involved AFHQ would have advocated attempting to secure a military agreement with Tito in which AMG would have been limited to the area essential to communications with Austria. Complex political factors, however, appeared to preclude such an agreement. Expressly limited though it was to purely operational purposes, it would be construed by Tito, by Italians, and by the world as recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty east of the proposed military boundary. The State Department and no doubt the Foreign Office opposed any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier in advance of a general peace settlement. However, AC had already assured the Italian Government that the whole of Venezia Giulia, like the rest of Italy, would be placed under AMG. These political situations precluded any departure from the accepted policy that all Italy should come under AMG upon liberation. On the other hand, Yugoslav forces were already installed in Venezia Giulia and would probably be able to extend their hold over the entire area before Allied forces could arrive. There might be some truth in Tito's contention that unless his civil administration was allowed to continue in existence chaos would ensue.

   Thus AFHQ proposed to the CCS that the Allies make a virtue of necessity and invite the provisional Yugoslav Government, as soon as it was formed, to participate as an ally in the AMG of Venezia Giulia. Specifically AFHQ made the following suggestions:
- that the Yugoslavs be invited to send representatives to consult with AFHQ on plans for military government;
- that arrangements be made for British or American forces to occupy the line-of-communication area and perhaps also Fiume and Pola;
- that Yugoslav forces in other areas of Venezia Giulia come under orders of Allied commanders; and
- that AMG officers be associated with such civil authorities as were found functioning in the territory.
Field Marshal Alexander informed the CCS that, in his opinion, the acceptance of this plan would depend entirely upon an agreement with the Soviet Union before the invitation was extended. He therefore requested that serious effort be made to secure such an agreement.

   As the time drew near for the final offensive in northern Italy a solution for Venezia Giulia was urgently needed but the requested decision from the governmental level had not yet been received. If orders were not issued in time AFHQ saw only two practicable alternatives - to keep to the military boundary already proposed or to set up a separate AMG for the entire Venezia Giulia area. The first alternative presented no problem as it merely involved a reduction in the AC commitment for the Venezia region. The second entailed a considerable extra manpower commitment and also presented complicated policy questions. To meet the second eventuality G-5 directed AC in early April 1945 to prepare a plan for a separate AMG in Venezia Giulia under a military governor directly responsible to AFHQ instead of AC. The military governor would be assisted by a purely advisory council representing the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and possibly also Italy and Yugoslavia.(5) In mid-April AC submitted a plan of this character, calling for a total of 117 officers rather than the 70 allotted to the area on the assumption that it would be a part of the Venezia Region. The plan provided for the continuation. in accordance with international law, of whatever administration, police, and legislation were found on entry.
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(5) This proposal was one of four alternate courses of action being considered by the British Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the CCS.
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