Civil Affairs and Military Government
in the Mediterranean Theater

Robert W Komer

Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army [1948]

Chapter XV
The Occupation of Venezia Giulia (pp. XV.1-XV.17)

The Occupation of Venezia Giulia

   The situation in Venezia Giulia developed exactly as AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters] had feared. When, in April 1945 Eighth Army opened the final Allied offensive in northern Italy and drove up the eastern end of the Po Valley, the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff] had still not defined its policy on Venezia Giulia. Field Marshal [Sir Harold] Alexander felt that he could no longer postpone action. One course was to occupy the entire region and establish AMG [Allied Military Government] throughout. SACMED [Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean; Alexander] believed, however, that unless the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Tito he would refuse to withdraw from Venezia Giulia and would fight if the attempt was made to disarm his forces. On 27 April Alexander informed the CCS that unless instructed to the contrary he would seize only those parts of Venezia Giulia which were of importance to his operation.(6) These areas would include Trieste, Pola, and the roads and railways leading to Austria. AMG would be set up as part of the regular military government organization in Italy but it would administer through suitable local personnel, Italian or Yugoslav, as might be found in the area. Alexander stated that before his forces entered Venezia Giulia he would inform Tito of his intentions and explain that any Yugoslav forces remaining must come under Allied command. The Field Marshal considered that this plan would meet his military requirements but requested that if the United States and United Kingdom Governments desired any other course for political reasons he be notified immediately.
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(6) Mr. [Harold] Macmillan advocated this course in the SACMED's Political Conference of 26 April. While recognizing that the occupation of Venezia Giulia was politically desirable, he believed that SACMED should restrict himself to taking only what action was necessary for military reasons and should inform CCS that if his armies were to be used for political ends he must have early instructions in order that he might estimate the forces required.
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   Shortly afterward, on 28 April, a directive of the CCS was finally received. As suspected, it was based on political considerations, and it called for a radically different policy from that which AFHQ had favored. AFHQ was to establish and maintain till the peace treaty a combined Anglo-American AMG throughout Venezia Giulia (including Fiume and the Quarnerolo Islands but excluding Zara) and in Tarvisio and the surrounding areas which before 1919 formed part of Austrian Carinthia. AMG was to function on entry. Soviet concurrence would be sought in requesting the Yugoslav Government to withdraw all Yugoslav forces from Venezia Giulia. If the Yugoslavs failed to cooperate AFHQ was to report to the CCS before taking further action. The two governments, it was stated, recognized that the success of this plan depended on Soviet co-operation and subsequent Yugoslav agreement. If military necessity required, AFHQ was to implement the plan before Soviet and Yugoslav agreement was obtained.

   G-3 [Operations] AFHQ, however, took the view that no attempt should be made toward the complete occupation of Venezia Giulia which would interfere with the primary objective of destroying the enemy and effecting the earliest possible entry into Austria. At this stage the CCS policy should be carried out merely insofar as was necessary for the main task, and only later, as operations permitted, should AFHQ take steps to occupy the whole of Venezia Giulia. G-3 also suggested that since the obtaining of Soviet and Yugoslav concurrence to the Allied plan would take no little time, AFHQ, already about to enter Venezia Giulia, should at least inform Tito now of its military intentions.

   AFHQ instructed 15th Army Group only to implement immediately such portions of the CCS plan as were operationally feasible. 15th Army Group's primary mission was to secure the Trieste line of communication to Austria but it was to continue operations until Venezia Giulia was completely cleared and AMG established, or until it made contact with the regular Yugoslav armed forces. Care was to be exercised to avoid any clashes with these forces. In both the taking of Venezia Giulia and the establishment of AMG, personnel were to be provided jointly from British and American resources. AFHQ informed both CCS and Marshal Tito of its intentions. The CCS approved these measures in the light of operational circumstances and informed AFHQ that it would receive further instructions later.

   As AFHQ had feared, the actual situation in Venezia Giulia developed in such a way as to preclude full implementation of the CCS plan. Eighth Army swept northeast though Venezia and, by May 2, date of the German surrender, had entered Monfalcone. Here, along the Isonzo River, the Allies [2nd New Zealand Infantry Division] came into contact with Yugoslav forces which had entered Venezia Giulia from the east. On 2 May Tito replied to Alexander that the situation had changed markedly since their Belgrade meeting. As the Yugoslav Fourth Army had already liberated almost the whole of Venezia Giulia, Tito had ordered it to liberate the remainder, including Trieste and Monfalcone, as far as the Isonzo and to advance up the Isonzo toward the Austrian frontier. He requested that Alexander order his troops to make contact along the Isonzo line to prepare the details of co-ordination. He also announced his willingness, in accordance with the Belgrade discussions, to allow the Allies to use the port of Trieste and Pola and the Tarvisio rail line to Austria. At the same time the Yugoslav Fourth Army informed Eighth Army of its notification by GHQ in Belgrade that since the Yugoslavs had liberated the territory east of the Isonzo there was no need for Allied troops in that area. Consequently the Fourth Army could not allow the Allies to cross the Isonzo.

   Before AFHQ could decide how to meet this situation the 2nd New Zealand Division had already crossed the Isonzo, and on 2 May it entered Trieste and captured the German garrison. Although the Yugoslavs controlled the rest of the city, the Germans still occupied the port area and also Gorizia and Monfalcone. SACMED now considered it would be best to push ahead quietly, avoiding open clashes with the Yugoslavs, and to occupy the strategically important areas of Istria. He did not consider Tito's reply unfavorable and proposed to assume that, as previously agreed, Tito intended to allow Yugoslav forces in the immediate area of the Allied line of communication to come under Allied command. He felt that with tact and firmness no difficulty need arise in the occupation of Trieste and the railway to Austria even if it could not be altogether avoided in the establishment of AMG.

   It was quite clear, however, that any suggestion of the occupation of the whole of Istria would produce quite different consequences. SACMED decided that a course of acting on a purely military basis had been forced upon him and that he could do nothing to resolve the political problem, which now required action on the governmental level. Mr. Macmillan agreed that, since the United States and the United Kingdom clearly did not wish to become involved in a war with the Yugoslavs,(7) it was no longer practicable to occupy the whole of Istria. SACMED dispatched a cautious reply to Tito, stating that he proposed to take the course previously agreed on. At the same time he decided to proceed with firmness and tact to occupy the areas of military importance and to rely on the judgement of local Allied commanders to avoid serious clashes. He considered it best not to mention AMG, which would be established in the normal manner in areas under Allied control.
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(7) On 2 May the British Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing that AFHQ should occupy as much of the area as possible, had ordered that if trouble developed the Allied forces should halt, parlay, and report to the CCS. The matter could then be settled at a governmental level.
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   Yugoslav Partisans and regular army troops had set up in Venezia Giulia a local administration which, comprised largely of organizations which had been in existence underground for some time, appeared to be in control of the areas. Since it was supported by the Yugoslav forces any attempt to superimpose AMG upon it could well lead to clash. Consequently Eighth Army did not establish AMG east of the Isonzo. G-5 [Civil Affairs, AFHQ] approved this course and directed that no steps be taken to set up AMG in this area until ordered.(8)
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(8) Serious food shortages developed in the area in early May and AC [Allied Commission] urgently asked instructions on feeding the civilian population. Since Tito would not give way on the issue of control, AFHQ directed that no AMG supplies could be used. Nor could UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency] supplies be brought in, since it was Italian territory. Distribution of AMG supplies in adjacent Udine Province was to be rigidly controlled. While civilian hardships were to be deplored, the situation had arisen because the Yugoslavs had blocked the establishment of AMG and thus prevented the distribution of already stockpiled Allied foodstuffs.
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   On 3 May Tito protested vigorously against Allied entry into Trieste, Monfalcone, and Gorizia, which had been liberated by the Yugoslavs. Field Marshal Alexander replied that he was astonished at Tito's apparent disregard of the Belgrade agreement in unilaterally ordering his troops to occupy territory as far west as the Isonzo. He pointed out that the agreement had stipulated not only that the Allies should have full control of the port of Trieste and the line of communication to Austria but also that any Yugoslav troops in this area would come under Allied command. Since the question demanded an immediate solution, SACMED suggested that Tito send his Chief of Staff to Bari to iron out the problem with SACMED's Chief of Staff. Tito replied on 5 May as follows:

   "I was surprised at your readiness to express my doubts as to the respect on my part of the Belgrade Agreement. Remember I am not bound solidly by my military responsibilities as CinC but also by my responsibilities as Prime Minister, who must first of all take care of his country's interests. In my May 2d message I underlined that I am keeping my word given in Belgrade that you may use Trieste and Pola as well as the L of C to Austria."

   "The situation has changed by my occupation of Italy up to the Isonzo. The occupation of this territory was not a purely military character but also a political one. Yugoslavia is very interested in this territory not only as a victor but also because the territories were unjustly annexed as the result of a former peace treaty. I consider that a great injustice has been done our martyred country when one recognizes only her duties and not her rights as an Allied nation at war."

   "It is very awkward that discussions should have started in the Allied and Italian press after the occupation of Trieste by our troops, which spread the wildest rumors. Our army, which has shed so much blood for the common cause, is being insulted."

   "I think that we shall easily agree on a way of smoothing out these misunderstandings and am ready to send my chief of staff to Baris[sic] or to Trieste where it is better your Chief of Staff should come immediately. My troops are ordered to hold all occupied territory and not impede in any way your troops en route to Austria."(9)
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(9) NAF 948, 5 May 45
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The May Discussions with Tito

   With Yugoslav and Allied forces so intermingled in Venezia Giulia there was imminent danger of hostilities. The two Allied Governments were thus forced to modify their political objectives and to accept the AFHQ idea of a military agreement, Field Marshal Alexander, recognizing that full occupation was unattainable without the use of force, still felt that the only practicable course was to limit himself to military aims. He informed the CCS that unless instructed to the contrary he would immediately send his Chief of Staff to Belgrade to attempt to conclude a military agreement giving the Allies control of the civil line of communication. The CCS acquiesced to this proposal but directed SACMED to make it quite clear to Tito that a military agreement would not affect the ultimate disposition of any prewar Italian territory.

   Lt. Gen. W. D. Morgan, Chief of Staff AFHQ, held three meetings with Marshal Tito in Belgrade from 7 to 9 May. At the outset Tito made it clear that he could not accept the proposed military agreement. He argued that since he had conquered Venezia Giulia and had every intention of claiming it, together with territory to the west, his country should be allowed to occupy this territory as a reward for its efforts in the Allied cause. He reiterated his willingness to give the Allies the use of Trieste and the roads and railroads to Austria, which, he thought, would amply meet Allied needs. After much discussion Tito yielded a bit and suggested a joint military command: military commander[s] of equal rank would command the troops of their own nationality. But Tito reiterated that civil administration would be conducted by the Yugoslav authorities already established. General Morgan found this proposal quite beyond his power to discuss and referred it to AFHQ.

   SACMED considered Tito's proposal militarily unacceptable. It was essential that his line of communication be under his own control and not, as in Tito's proposal, dependent upon the good will of others. Therefore he instructed General Morgan to inform Tito that he could not agree to a joint military command or recede from his demand for a clear demarcation line except possibly for making slight adjustments in the line and allowing Tito to keep some regular troops west of the line, under Allied command. While the Allies would use any Yugoslav civil administration already in the area, such an administration must function under AMG. Finally, Tito was to be informed that if he failed to accept the military agreement SACMED would be compelled to refer the matter to London and Washington, with which Tito would have to deal in the future.

   In the last meeting with Morgan, Tito was adamant in his contention that the matter had assumed a predominantly political significance, and in his refusal to accept the military terms. General Morgan concluded that Tito would not yield on the issue of sovereignty, that he considered his joint command plan workable and that military conversations would bring the Allies no farther.

   Tito's reply left only two courses open - either to eject the Yugoslavs by force or to accept a diplomatic defeat. From the purely military point of view such a defeat would not be serious, as Venice and the railways had been seized largely undamaged and could be developed as a line of communication to Austria, at any rate for a time. Field Marshal Alexander decided to send the CCS a full military appreciation of the forces required to oust the Yugoslavs, and, pending further instructions, to continue to use Trieste without any formal agreement. AMG would not be established, however, in Allied-held areas east of the Isonzo as this would entail the risk of hostilities. Meanwhile Venice would be developed on second priority for use if required. Alexander believed that the Yugoslavs wished to avoid an open clash and that occupation of Trieste on this basis would work until the Allied governments could make their decision. He cabled Tito that as his counterproposal raised a political issue he was referring it to the American and British Governments, but that meanwhile he proposed to use Trieste and the line of communication to Austria and trusted Tito to take steps to avoid any regrettable incidents.

   In its report to the CCS, AFHQ indicated that the basic question was that of whether or not to use force. If it was decided that force should not be used, one possible course was to make an agreement along the lines Tito had suggested. This would mean loss of prestige as AFHQ had already informed Tito of Allied minimum requirements. However, as soon as the Italians realized that the Allies had virtually acquiesced in Tito's claims internal disorders were likely to occur in Italy. On the other hand, AFHQ considered that if Tito signed such an agreement he would live up to it and co-operate to make it work. Another possible course, if force was to be avoided, was merely to continue as at present, remaining in the area without a formal agreement and maintaining Allied forces as well as possible. This course would keep the question open for political negotiations. If, however, force was to be used the resources would depend primarily on whether or not the Soviet Union supported Tito. Even if it did not, the resources acquired by Tito from the recent German surrenders would make it necessary to use a total of eleven divisions. If the Soviet Union actively helped Tito it would be impossible to estimate the requirements but they would clearly be beyond the theater's resources.

   The CCS approved the status quo for the time being and directed AFHQ to exert no military pressure on Tito. It was to confine negotiations with him to making arrangements for developing and operating the line of communication to Austria and was to take steps to insure that hostilities could only occur through Yugoslav attack. Thus the month of May in Venezia Giulia was a period of armed truce, during which each side held its ground.

The Agreement on the Morgan Line

   The dispute was now taken up on a government level. Since war with Yugoslavia was obviously undesirable, the United States and Great Britain perforce accepted the view of AFHQ that a military boundary dividing Venezia Giulia was the only practicable solution. They agreed on a demarcation line which was necessary to meet Allied requirements. West of this line, which included Pola and the Istrian anchorages, AMG was to be established under SACMED's authority. On 15 May 1945 the American and British Ambassadors at Belgrade presented notes to Tito to this effect. Tito at first reiterated his earlier proposal but on 21 May agreed to the establishment of AMG in Venezia Giulia. He insisted that the line established be the Morgan line proposed earlier by AFHQ rather than that now suggested by the governments. At the same time the Yugoslav Government considered it indispensable that (1) representatives of the Yugoslav Army be included in AMG, (2) that units of the Yugoslav Army remain in the area under command of SACMED, and (3) that, in accordance with the previous AFHQ proposal of May, AMG act through the civil authorities already in the area.

   The State Department considered that equal Yugoslav Army representation in AMG would prejudice the principles constantly maintained by the Allied governments. If such representation was permitted it should be on a token basis only and subject to the authority of local Allied military commanders. There was no objection to units of the Yugoslav Army remaining, but in view of changes in the situation since the May proposals the department believed that the Yugoslav civil administration might not meet AFHQ's requirements for a satisfactory local administration. In any case it should not be allowed to function in purely Italian centers of population. The State Department agreed that negotiations with Tito should be opened immediately in Belgrade on this basis but only on condition that the Yugoslavs first withdraw east of the line which the two governments had proposed.

   Meanwhile Venezia Giulia continued to be a powder keg. Although the Yugoslavs offered no serious opposition to Allied use of the port of Trieste and the roads and railways, they often victimized the local inhabitants and requisitioned or confiscated everything in sight. Their behavior made a very unfavorable impression on the Allied troops, who were forced to stand by and watch. AFHQ became convinced that a solution based on joint Allied-Yugoslav occupation of the area or the use of Yugoslav administration would not succeed. Revising its earlier view, it informed the CCS that it could not allow AMG to act through the Yugoslav civil administrators already in the area. AFHQ insisted that AMG be empowered to use any civil authorities deemed best and to change personnel at its own discretion, although Yugoslav civil administrators would be used wherever they were functioning satisfactorily. AFHQ could not agree to Yugoslav officers participating in AMG, but did not object to a small Yugoslav mission being attached to Eighth Army Headquarters as observers. It agreed further to the occupation of an area selected by AFHQ west of the Morgan line by a Yugoslav regular detachment of not over 2,000 men. AFHQ made the additional condition that the Yugoslavs return all non-Yugoslav residents whom they had arrested or deported from the area, and return property which they had confiscated or removed. With these amendments AFHQ would approve the draft agreement except for insisting that it should not be a military agreement but an agreement between the two Allied governments and the Yugoslav Government.(10)
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(10) AFHQ also considered it both unnecessary and unwise to demand Pola and a line of communication from Pola to Trieste. The President, however, decided in favor of demanding Pola and establishing AMG in Pola and such other areas on the west coast as AFHQ considered necessary. SACMED informed the CCS that this would be a most unwelcome commitment, especially if it should be necessary to seize Pola by force, and that under such conditions he would need at least one division to maintain his position there. But the United States continued to insist that Pola by included in any approach to Tito and secured British concurrence. Through the CCS, however, AFHQ was informed that if Tito opposed the demand Allied forces would not be required to occupy the city.
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   On 4 June 1945 The British and American Ambassadors presented a revised draft agreement to Yugoslav Vice-Premier Kardelj. They made it clear that it represented the last word of their governments and that no further revision was possible. Kardelj's only major suggestion was that Italian administration be excluded from eastern Friuli, where, he claimed, the Slovene population was being victimized. The ambassadors replied that this and any other details could be settled by a conference of the Chiefs of Staff. The agreement was finally signed on 9 June 1945.

   The agreement stipulated that the territory of Venezia Giulia west of the line decided upon should come under the Supreme Allied Commander. This territory included Trieste; the railways and roads from there to Austria via Gorizia, Caporetto, and Tarvisio; Pola; and anchorages on the west coast of Istria. All naval, military, and air forces west of the line would come under his command from the moment the agreement came into force. Yugoslav troops in the area would be limited to a detachment of regular troops not exceeding 2,000 of all ranks, who would be maintained by the Supreme Allied Commander's administrative services. They would occupy a district selected by the Supreme Allied Commander west of the dividing line and would not be allowed access to the remainder of the area. Marshal Tito would withdraw all other Yugoslav regular forces then in the portion of Venezia Giulia west of the line. Any irregular forces in this area would, according to decision of SACMED in each case, either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disband, or withdraw from these areas.

   Using Allied Military Government, SACMED would govern areas west of the line, Pola, and such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he might deem necessary.(11) A small Yugoslav mission could be attached to the headquarters of the Eighth Army as observers. Use would be made of any Yugoslav civil administration already set up and, in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander, working satisfactorily. The AMG would, however, be empowered to use whatever civil authorities they deemed best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion.
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(11) No anchorages on the west coast of Istria between Muggia and Pola ever actually came under Anglo-American control.
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   The Yugoslav government would return the residents of these areas whom they had arrested or deported, with the exception of persons who possessed Yugoslav nationality in 1939, and make restitution of property that they had confiscated or removed.

   This agreement would in no way prejudice or affect the ultimate disposal of parts of Venezia Giulia west of the line. Similarly the military occupation and administration by Yugoslavia of parts of Venezia Giulia east of the line would in no way prejudice or affect the ultimate disposal of that area.

   In compliance with the new agreement, the Yugoslav forces retired east of the Morgan line by 12 June 1945, seventy-two hours after it had been signed. Eighth Army troops then advanced to the general vicinity of the line, the exact demarcation of which was to be settled at the conference of the Chiefs of Staff.

   Generals Morgan and Jovanovis met at British XIII Corps Headquarters at Duino from 13 to 20 June to negotiate a military agreement amplifying that which had been reached at Belgrade. Since the Morgan line cut across existing areas of civil administration and economic activity, it was necessary to make joint arrangements to insure a minimum of interference with the normal life of Venezia Giulia. The most important proposals suggested by General Morgan to link the two areas were as follows:
(1) continuation of uncontrolled telephone and telegraph communication and mail service;
(2) continuation of rail communication and establishment of a joint operating agency to regulate traffic, use of rolling stock, fuel provision, etc.;
(3) continuation of normal economic movement across the line, subject only to sufficient control to prevent unauthorized movement of goods (a joint economic agency would be established to work out detailed arrangements for interchange of power and joint use of the mineral and agricultural resources of both areas);
(4) arrangements for provision of funds from the principal financial institutions under AMG to communities, post offices, and branch banks east of the line, subject to normal financial controls and to mutual arrangements for check collection and continuation of insurance and pension payments;
(5) access by representatives of government departments and public and private companies to all administrative records throughout both areas in order to facilitate normal activity.(12)
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(12) Cable No FX-91149, AFHQ to Eighth Army, 11 Jun 45.
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   G-5 AFHQ feared that the Morgan proposals for these joint agencies might lead to undue participation of the Yugoslavs in activities west of the line. If the Yugoslavs should infiltrate into various AMG agencies they would achieve the very thing which the Allies had been trying to prevent. In the Belgrade agreement AFHQ had not requested any voice in Yugoslav activities east of the Morgan line and by the same token did not expect the Yugoslavs to participate in activities west of the line. AFHQ directed Morgan to be very firm in all matters, especially AMG affairs, and to hold strictly to the terms of the Belgrade agreement. All joint agencies operating west of the Morgan line were to be viewed with utmost suspicion.

   General Morgan did not share this fear that the joint agencies might operate as a "Trojan horse" for Yugoslav infiltration into AMG. Moreover, he felt that if the economic life of Trieste and other cities in Venezia Giulia was not to be paralyzed, and if the many practical problems of administration were to be achieved, it was important for the Allies to establish the necessary joint machinery. If trains were to continue to run into the Yugoslav zone working arrangements on traffic priorities and allocation of rolling stock would be necessary. The Allies, controlling the industries and power of the Traka region, would also be obliged to work out agreements to obtain the vital coal controlled by the Yugoslavs.

   The Yugoslavs made several minor requests regarding AMG matters and also asked for an increase in their army detachment from 2,000 to 5,000. They repeated their claim that the predominantly Slovene population of eastern Friuli was being terrorized by the Italian administration, and expressed their desire that this area be included under the special AMG. Furthermore, the considered that since Yugoslavia intended to claim the area, it should remain under this administration until the peace treaty. AFHQ took no action on these requests, leaving the Yugoslavs to take them up through diplomatic channels if they so desired.

   The Yugoslavs were primarily concerned with maintaining the system of civil administration which they had set up in Venezia Giulia during their occupation. Replacing the Italian system, they had established a system of committees based on the Soviet model: Committees of National Liberation, with various subcommittees exercising executive power in administrative fields. The pattern had been duplicated on the district and communal levels. The Yugoslavs took the position that Paragraph 3 of the Belgrade agreement, providing for the continuation of existing civil administration which was operating satisfactorily, committed the Allies to adopting this committee system.

   General Spofford, General Morgan's chief civil affairs adviser, maintained that as the basic law of Venezia Giulia was Italian the international law of occupation required that the Italian administrative system be continued. In his view the agreement committed the Allies only to use of existing personnel and not to maintenance of the administrative system. General Spofford felt it imperative that the committee system as an executive instrument be eliminated, but suggested the utilization of committees in an advisory capacity as in other parts of Italy. AFHQ approved this policy as the only practical course.

   A military agreement was signed on 20 June 1945. It made no reference to the controversial issues of civil administration. It defined precisely the boundary between the two zones, Yugoslav rights to war booty, and conditions under which the Yugoslav Army detachment would operate. Further it provided for joint operation of railroads and for establishment of joint economic agencies; detailed agreements were left to later settlement. After the signing of the agreement, XIII Corps extended its occupation of Venezia Giulia to the Morgan Line as newly defined. The CCS made AFHQ responsible for implementing the agreement and requested it to report on the forces which would be required in Venezia Giulia until the question [interpreted here as referring to the peace treaty] was settled. AFHQ was to continue taking all precautions against outbreak of hostilities and was, if possible, to consult the CCS before ever using force.

Establishment of Military Government

   On 12 June military government was established without incident in the British-American part of Venezia Giulia. According to plan, the area was divorced from Tre-Venezie Region, designated "Allied Military Government XIII Corps" (later AMG Venezia Giulia), and placed under operational control of Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding, the XIII Corps commander. [When American forces were moved to Venezia Giulia they came under British XIII Corps command.] To avoid any impact on the future national status of the territory, the basic proclamation [announcing military government] was altered slightly from the form used in Italy proper; AC, however, was to exercise technical supervision as elsewhere.

   Since the need was urgent and no instrument had been received from the CCS, AFHQ issued on 26 June an interim directive that included the following provisions:
  1.   The administration should be integrated Anglo-American.
  2.   Nothing should be done that would prejudice the ultimate disposition of the area.
  3.   The "Morgan Line" would be open freely to civilians and commercial traffic, subject only to necessary controls to meet special exigencies.
  4.   Local government would be based on the Italian system, subject to necessary superficial modifications.
  5.   AMG XIII Corps would enjoy full discretion with respect to the government instrumentalities to be used and to changes in personnel.
  6.   Such existing Yugoslav civil administration as was working satisfactorily might be used, but "civil administration" should be construed to apply to personnel rather than to the system.
  7.   The Italian civil law in effect on 8 September 1943 would remain in force, as already provided by proclamation, except for changes required by military necessity and the basic objectives of the occupation, but all subsequent legislation by the Fascist Republic, the Germans or the Yugoslavs, should be abrogated.
  8.   The right of appeal to Rome from Trieste courts should be suspended.
  9.   The activities of any existing "Peoples Courts" should be terminated, but all active Fascists, Nazis and collaborators should be interned.
  10.   Whatever police forces were found to be functioning satisfactorily, might be maintained and strengthened, but if these proved inadequate a new force might by organized.
  11.   Existing civil services, financial institutions, tax systems, and other established institutions, might be used on an autonomous local basis.
  12.   Metropolitan and AMG lire should be the only recognized legal tender.
  13.   Communication and trade throughout both zones would be continued as normally as possible through a Joint Railway and a Joint Economic Committee.

   Later the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirmed virtually all aspects of these interim instructions, which became the permanent pre-treaty occupation chapter [charter] of military government.

   Thereafter, the most critical theater-level administrative problem was the jurisdictional conflict between AC and XIII Corps. AFHQ felt that the political situation in Venezia Giulia required that many matters normally handled by AC be treated as AFHQ business in order that AC's close relationship with the Italian Government would not be embarrassed. However, AC denied any embarrassment, asserted the same control of AMG in Venezia Giulia as in other parts of Italy, and protested when XIII Corps communicated directly with AFHQ.(13) Since facilities for technical supervision existed only at AC, some compromise was obviously required. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer in Trieste straddled the situation as best he could until mid-September 1945, when XIII Corps conceded that the situation had been sufficiently clarified by working experience for AC to resume giving AMG technical advice and assistance. However, XIII Corps continued to the end to insist on its prerogative of controlling AMG policy in all matters affecting law and order, and this jurisdictional dispute continued to embarrass operations until the transfer of residual AC responsibilities to G-5 AFHQ, on 15 March 1947.
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(13) On 25 July 1945, when Eighth Army Headquarters had moved to Austria, XIII Corps passed under the direct command of AFHQ.
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   The most pressing local matter was public safety. The only existing police force was the so-called "Peoples Defense" organized by the Yugoslavs and comprised of local Partisans whose principal activity had been the highly unnerving (to local citizens) arrest and deportation of some 3,000 people. This force, and all others, including the traditional Italian carabinieri, were disarmed and abolished. In their place the Venezia Giulia Police Force was established, which by the summer of 1947 comprised 6,000 men. Composed entirely of indigenous personnel, this force, integrating all public safety services including fire fighting, was organized in accordance with British and American police concepts and was commanded by Allied officers under the direction of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer of XIII Corps. It was invaluable in the handling of the demonstrations, strikes, and other organized violence which characterized the occupation, and became by 1947 one of the most modern and advanced forces in Continental Europe, employing all modern police techniques.

   International law required the preservation of the laws in force, and this requirement was construed to mean the 25-year old Italian constitutional system rather than the 25-day old Yugoslav hierarchy of "Committees". When it became apparent, as it soon did, that preservation of the Yugoslav Soviet-style institutions was in any event incompatible with impartial, efficient, and responsible administration, these instrumentalities were by-passed and disregarded. In July 1945 the Yugoslav Government officially objected to these alleged breaches of the Belgrade agreement. Upon advice of AFHQ, supported by CCS, the Yugoslav protests were rejected by the United States and Great Britain, and on 11 August 1945 the local government policy was made permanent by General Order No. 11, promulgated by Col. Alfred C. Bowman, USA, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who was the head of the civil administration during virtually the entire pre-treaty period.
[Think of General Harding, GOC XIII Corps and therefore "Military Governor", functioning as 'Head of State', while Colonel Bowman, SCAO, served as his 'Head of Government'.]

   This order officially eliminated all governmental authority claimed by agencies other that those created by Military Government. It also prescribed in detail the approved form of local administration, which was based on the Italian system with local councils appointed by AMG, and new nomenclature to avoid fascist connotations and inferences of future Italian sovereignty. Repeated attempts, in the interest of impartiality, to obtain pro-Yugoslav representation on these local councils was largely abortive, due to the candidates' fear of Communist retaliation for "collaboration".

   The promulgation of General Order No. 11 marked the beginning of a Russo-Yugoslav policy of obstruction, provocation, and threatened violence, which continued throughout the occupation. The order was, however, effectively implemented except in a few sparsely populated remote areas where pro-Yugoslav recalcitrance sometimes required direct local government by Allied officers. Administration was based on three geographical areas, with headquarters at Gorizia, Trieste, and Pola.

   An import program was set up to provide the population, as in northern Italy, with a 700-calory ration, including 200 grams of bread. Approximately 9,000 tons of supplies, chiefly flour, were immediately programmed for monthly shipment, since the territory itself produced only 35 days' supply of basic foods per year. In September XIII Corps urged increase of this ration to 1,250 calories on the grounds that the existing scale was inadequate to maintain health. As elsewhere in Italy, the basic ration was intended to be supplemented by local fruits and vegetables form other parts of Italy or Yugoslavia. AMG was apprehensive that the autonomous and sealed-off status of Venezia Giulia would prevent continued imports in adequate measure, which would mean that Venezia Giulia would be less well fed than adjacent areas and would furnish the enemies of Anglo-American policy with an excuse for creating serious disorders. AFHQ denied this request on the ground that to grant it without a corresponding increase in northern Italy would constitute preferential treatment. AC was, however, directed to take appropriate measures to prevent interference by Italian authorities with the free flow of non-rationed commodities into Venezia Giulia.

   While the problems continued to be serious, in general the authorities in northern Italy co-operated well, and economic incentives were sufficient to induce both Italians and Yugoslavs to provide much extra-ration food for the territory. Nor did the supply of imported rationed food ever completely fail during the occupation, although specific exigencies required AMG periodically to needle AFHQ, and on occasion it was necessary to reroute a ship at the last critical movement [moment] or to borrow against future deliveries from Peninsular Base Section or from 88th Division, the American garrison.

   The isolated economic situation of the territory necessarily obstructed normal channels of trade and it was feared that the explosive political issues would cause any resulting unemployment to be exploited violently for political purposes. To absorb any such unemployment as well as to accomplish the physical rehabilitation of the area, an extensive public works program was undertaken, financed by Italian lire though the Bank of Italy, as in the rest of the [Italian] peninsula. This was directed first toward the creation of a stable public psychology by destruction of actual fortifications, then to the rebuilding of shipyards, factories, roads, bridges, and bombed buildings; then to agriculture, reforestation, and fisheries projects; and to new roads, tunnels, and housing.

   The basic AMG formula which restricted expenditure of funds for rehabilitation to the prevention of disease and unrest limited these activities, but by liberal and judicious interpretation at AFHQ sufficient funds were made available. The payroll employed on public works eventually reached 20,000 persons before it scaled off with the revival of normal business. The program accomplished the complete physical rehabilitation in the area and was more responsible than any other activity for keeping an explosive situation from becoming disastrous.

   The fiduciary character of the occupation and the inhibition against "steps ... which support or may appear to support or prepare for any ultimate disposition of the area to any claimant nation" required the re-establishment of a Slovene school system, which had been abolished as a part of the vigorous Italianization policy of the fascist regime. The announcement in the early summer of 1945 that Slovene schools would be re-established aroused Italian ire, but more serious difficulty later arose from the insistence of AMG that it would retain exclusive control of school operations against vigorous and insistent efforts by the communist pro-Slav population to use the schools for propaganda. Allied school officials were called "Fascists, Chetniks, and Demobranzi"; pictures of Tito were hung in school rooms whenever an Allied back was turned; and the bribery, corruption, and oppression of teachers in the more remote Slovene areas required constant vigilance and stronger measures, including the occasional closing of schools. An entirely new set of Slovene texts were prepared, since books promised by the Yugoslav authorities were found when delivered to be full of Communist and Partisan propaganda.

   The communist pro-Slav policy included a tireless, clockwork schedule of strikes, demonstrations, parades, and synthetic "funerals" intended to demonstrate the Slovene ethnic character of the city of Trieste and the aspiration of the people to join the Republic of Yugoslavia. During the first six months of the occupation, these "spontaneous" demonstrations were allowed to occur freely, on the theory that the participants would tire of them and natural forces would cause them to disappear. There were no fatalities as a result of even the roughest of them. When, however. it became apparent that they were being held on orders from outside forces, and were likely to continue, a system of permits was inaugurated. This legalization seemed to deprive the demonstrations of much of their attraction and during the early part of 1946 there were few. However, the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers in early July that Trieste should be a free territory set off a new series of communist strikes and demonstrations, together with Italian retaliation which included violence. This month was also characterized by the longest of many "general strikes" based on ostensibly economic motives but actually intended primarily to impair the authority and prestige of Allied Military Government. It was necessary to supplement the civilian police by using military police during this period. However, a unique feature of the administration was the maintenance throughout the occupation of a completely free press. This included license to criticize the administration itself and Allied officers, which was freely exercised with no retaliation.

   Much time and effort during the last year of AMG Venezia Giulia was devoted to planning for the Free Territory and for the turnover to Italy and Yugoslavia of portions of the occupied area not to be included in it. Allied policy was one of making both sides peaceably accept an accomplished fact, however disagreeable. The pro-Yugoslavs became much more co-operative, presumably realizing that they had won much of what they wanted. The Italians were more violent, treating as a personal affront every step toward carrying out the decision of the Peace Conference. The evacuation of Pola was the most critical single problem. Four-fifths of its Italian people abandoned the soil which they had occupied for centuries - not because they legally had to, but because they either could or would not live on non-Italian soil, or had seen too much of Yugoslav rule during the "forty days' [2 May to 12 June 1945].

   Meanwhile, R Day (the day when the treaty was to be ratified), R-J Day (the day when the Yugoslavs [Jugoslavs], as such, would ratify), and G Day (the day when the Governor of the Free Territory might be expected to arrive) were all estimated, postponed, re-estimated and re-postponed. R Day and R-J Day finally arrived simultaneously, on September 15, 1947. On this date the occupation of Venezia Giulia ceased. AMG Venezia Giulia was succeeded by the smaller AMG Trieste Free Territory, which was based on the Peace Treaty(14) and not on belligerent occupation.
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(14) See the conclusion of Chapter XX. [not presented here]
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[G Day never arrived; the UN Security Council agreed to disagree to act on the appointment.]

[Afterword: "The 1947 treaty gave most of the city of Gorizia to Italy and the bulk of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia. But in Trieste itself no border could be agreed, and it remained 'provisionally' divided until a final settlement was made in 1954." - Harold Macmillan, the last two sentences of his "War Diaries".]