

# A Military Encyclopedia

## Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.

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### *Chapter One*

## **PERSONNEL**

### ***Section 1. Infantry Replacements***

The need for maintaining combat units constantly at T/O [Table of Organization] strength by the early replacement of casualties became apparent early in the campaign. Initially routine methods of replacement, involving the dropping of casualties from unit rolls, the requisitioning of replacements, and the filling of such requisitions from replacement sources some distance in rear of the divisions required a period of at least four or five days.

Studies to determine practical methods of shortening this period were linked with plans to provide the infantry divisions with advance allotments of replacements to be trained with and assimilated into units prior to their employment as replacements for combat casualties. Experience in late 1943 and the early months of 1944 wherein a shortage of infantry replacements occurred, crystallized opinion.

Before the attack on the Gustav Line in May, 1944, each division was given an overstrength of 750 infantrymen. This overstrength was broken down by the divisions and an overstrength of 250 allotted to each infantry regiment. The 250 was further apportioned by the regiments to each rifle and heavy weapons company. During the defense phases these men received battle indoctrination and training with front line units. Prior to the start of offensive operations, surpluses allotted to the companies were withdrawn, generally to a training area in the vicinity of the regimental Service Co. bivouac area, and their training continued. In the case of one division, surpluses were withdrawn to a division replacement unit located in the division rear area, and there retained under division control. As casualties occurred, these men were forwarded as replacements to the units with which they had trained. The 750 overstrength for the divisions was maintained by replacements from the rear.

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For the purpose of maintaining combat units at T/O strength in officer personnel approximately 50 company grade infantry officers were furnished each infantry division as an advance on replacements to be absorbed by attrition. These officers were assimilated into the units in the same manner as was the enlisted surplus. It was the consensus of division commanders that this number was not sufficient for infantry, and that the number should be further augmented by the inclusion of Field Artillery and Engineer officers in the overstrength allowed.

The above plan proved to be a practical solution to the problem of immediate replacement of battle losses, and contributed largely to the success of the attack on the Gustav Line and all operations thereafter.

## ***Section 2. Armored Replacements***

Whenever possible, armored units including the armored division, tank battalions, and tank destroyer battalions were authorized advance replacements. These replacements were organized as complete crews. Surplus tanks and tank destroyers were likewise authorized, and these crews and equipment were immediately available as replacements for casualties. In most instances the loss of a tank did not entail the loss of the entire crew. However, the practice of feeding one or two replacements into a crew in action to replace casualties was found to reduce the efficiency of the crew and to be wasteful of manpower eventually. Advance replacements were held in areas in the division rear, and were trained together as crews. Whenever a crew in action suffered casualties which caused it to become non-effective, it was withdrawn with its vehicle to the rear and a new crew and vehicle sent in as replacements. Casualties were replaced in the old crew which was then reorganized and trained as a unit to be used as a replacement crew when needed.

This system enabled armored units to sustain their maximum strength over prolonged periods of combat.

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## ***Section 3. Assignment and Reassignment of Officers***

The assignment and reassignment of officers presented a problem that became increasingly difficult as the campaign progressed. During the early period of the organization of the Fifth Army and of the Base sections in the Mediterranean area, vacancies existed for officers of all degrees of capability and of varied training and experience. It was not difficult at that time to place an officer in a position which was suited to his individual abilities. However, as time progressed, organizational vacancies in the army were filled, and at the same time the base sections reached a point where it was no longer easy to absorb officers found to be unsuited by temperament or experience to serve in a particular assignment. The higher the grade of the officer in question the more pronounced the problem became. Under the most favorable circumstances, which involved only the exchange of the officer relieved from duty in the forward areas with an officer in rear areas, a delay of considerable duration was occasioned by the necessity of training and orienting each officer in his new duties.

The procurement of suitable battalion commanders presented major difficulties. It was usually found necessary to request officers from the United States for such assignments. These officers were handicapped during the period of their indoctrination by lack of battle experience, and in consequence did not receive the complete confidence of their men. After a successful action this lack of confidence disappeared. In cases where the new battalion commander was unable to perform properly the duties required of him after a reasonable trial, reassignment or reclassification was indicated. If officers could have been made available, a practical and favored solution would have been to allow each division and separate battalion an overstrength in field officers.

Initially, in an effort to avoid the detailed procedures and delays of reclassification procedures, commanding officers were authorized to transfer officers found unsatisfactory in their current assignment but deemed satisfactory for assignment elsewhere.

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An officer in that category was sent successively to each higher command for the purpose of reassignment. If not sooner reassigned, he eventually reached a replacement pool. Here he was required to appear before a Board of Hearing which determined his proper disposition. Frequently the board found that reclassification proceedings were the proper solution and referred the case back to the unit concerned for their initiation. This was found to be a cumbersome and unsatisfactory method involving prolonged delays, and it was abandoned. The operation of the reclassification system under revised Army Regulations proved satisfactory.

At the time of the landings in North Africa, Task Force commanders were given authority to make combat appointments and commissions. Subsequently this authority was granted to succeeding commanders, and resulted in securing many junior officers of excellent caliber with battle experience and proven leadership and ability.

#### ***Section 4. Rotation - Temporary Duty in U.S.***

The return of military personnel to the United States was based on War Department policies and on directives issued by the Theater Commander. These policies and directives contemplated the return of the most deserving personnel, either on rotation (in which event they would not return to the same theater), or on temporary duty with return to the same unit prescribed. They directed that selection of personnel be based on length of overseas service, length of time in combat, decorations received, and wounds sustained. The number of persons to be rotated from the army was controlled by a quota established monthly by the theater commander.

Various methods of selection were given exhaustive study and trial. In order to arrive at a fair basis of selection and to spread the selection of rotation personnel as equitably as possible throughout all units of the army, a mathematical method of selection was worked out. Each unit was asked to recommend each month up to one and one half per cent of its assigned strength for rotation.

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This total was about twice the number that could be expected to fall within the quota. As recommendations were received at army headquarters each individual was given a numerical rating by a point system. Each month of service overseas counter one point, each decoration for meritorious service one point, possession of the Combat Infantry Badge two points, membership in a Distinguished Unit two points, a wound four points. Holders of the Distinguished Service Cross were given high priority and their selection was usually automatic. Selections to fill the balance of the army quota were apportioned among the units of the army in proportion to the strengths of units. Individuals having the highest numerical rating in each unit were selected.

The return of personnel to the United States on temporary duty for periods of up to forty-five days was accomplished without the restriction of a quota. Unit commanders determined the number of individuals

that could be spared, and selections were made by the army on the basis of available shipping space. Individuals returned to the United States on temporary duty were normally away from their units for a period of at least four months. In unusual cases, involving key personnel, air travel was authorized to shorten this period.

The replacement of personnel rotated to the United States was a continuing problem. It was not found practicable or expedient to retain personnel selected for rotation until their replacements had arrived from the United States. Under authority of the theater commander, individuals selected received orders and departed with a minimum of delay. Initially, directives required that requisitions for rotation replacements be made direct to Theater Headquarters. This procedure often entailed prolonged delay in the receipt of replacements. Subsequent directives changed this procedure, and Army was authorized to requisition rotation replacements from the army replacement depot, if not available elsewhere within the army. The depot filled that part of the requisition for which suitable personnel were available in the depot, and forwarded the balance of the requisition to the Replacement Command where the balance was filled if possible from its depots.

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That portion of the requisition still unfilled was forwarded by the Replacement Command to Theater Headquarters, which filled it by reassignment, or, if suitable personnel were not available, by requisition on the United States. If, after a period of six months, the vacancy still existed, the army commander was authorized to fill it by promotion.

In the majority of cases the replacements received were not of the same value to the unit as the individuals they replaced. Many enlisted replacements were overgraded for the duties they were expected to perform in combat. Frequently non-commissioned officers had received their ratings while assigned in different branches or on jobs where the requirements were entirely different. These men required additional training and orientation before they could properly perform the duties of their grade in their new assignments. Officer replacements lacked battle experience. In consequence it took some time for them to become as skillful or capable as the officers they replaced. In the case of battalion commanders the problem was particularly acute. In numerous cases a junior officer commanded the battalion over a prolonged period of time between the departure of the battalion commander on rotation and the arrival of his replacement. Inasmuch as the junior had in most cases battle experience lacked by the new commander, the morale of the unit was usually adversely affected during the period of readjustment.

Some undesirable results of temporary duty in the United States were noted among returned individuals. The physical benefits in most cases were marked, but in some cases there was a let-down in morale and in mental attitude which required a period of reorientation before the soldier again reached his former state of efficiency.

## ***Section 5. Army Detachment of Patients***

A Detachment of Patients (DOP), composed of two officers and sixteen enlisted men, was established by Army to administer and account for personnel during periods of hospitalization in Army hospitals.

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The DOP received a daily Admission and Hospitalization Report (WD AGO Form R5013) from each Army hospital. On this notification that a soldier had been admitted to an Army hospital, the DOP picked him up as attached unassigned to the DOP, effective the date of admission to the hospital. The soldier's organization was immediately notified by the DOP to drop him from its organizational rolls and strength. At the time the soldier was disposed of from the Army hospital system, he was dropped from the strength of the DOP and his organization notified. The DOP forwarded to the unit a copy of the admission slip, and also the disposition slip on which the final diagnosis had been entered.

A suspense file was kept by the DOP to assure the transmittal of Service Records and allied papers of patients transferred to Base Section Hospitals.

The DOP also received the A & D Reports from Base Hospitals, and notified all divisions assigned or attached to Army of the disposition of former members of their command who had been admitted to Base Section Hospitals. This was helpful in the forwarding of mail, and also enabled the divisions to maintain contact with key personnel whom they especially desired to recover.

A permanent file of all patients admitted to and disposed of from Army hospitals was kept at the DOP.

## ***Section 6. Women's Army Corps***

A detachment of the Women's Army Corps consisting of two officers and fifty-seven enlisted women was attached to the headquarters of Fifth Army early in the campaign. This was initially a self-supporting unit with necessary administrative and mess support. Experience taught that a separate mess for this detachment was unnecessary and undesirable, and it was discontinued. Enlisted women ate in the headquarters company mess with the men, and the officers in the officers mess.

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The mess personnel were transferred to other units and were replaced by qualified clerks.

The detachment was divided into two echelons which were assigned respectively to the forward and rear echelons of the headquarters, one WAC officer serving at each echelon. Enlisted women functioned in practically all sections of the headquarters as clerks, typists, stenographers, and telephone operators. Ratings, except for those few authorized for detachment administration, were earned in each section in competition with the enlisted men. While enlisted women were not counted against the table of organization strength of the various sections and were carried as an authorized surplus, there was no authority for surplus grades or ratings.

Women in this detachment were very carefully classified according to their civilian training and experience, and proved highly efficient in their various assignments.

At each location of the command post a quarters area was selected which was partially isolated from the rest of the installations yet close enough so that no inconvenience was experienced. All women quartered with the headquarters lived in this area. This included personnel of the American Red Cross and Army Nurse Corps. British enlisted women attached to the British Increment of the headquarters were further attached to the WAC detachment for administration and quarters.

Although at times exposed to enemy air attack, no casualties occurred among WAC personnel. General health was good. During the rigors of the winter spent under field conditions in the Apennine Mountains no unusual sick rate was experienced. Morale was maintained at a high level at all times. Disciplinary problems did not exist.

## **Section 7. G-1 Reports**

The methods used to render reports on the status of personnel to Army G-1 was developed and expanded by experience throughout the campaign.

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It was based on the information found to be necessary to keep the Army commander currently informed of the status of the personnel of the command.

Daily reports were submitted by all units as of midnight to include all changes occurring during the preceding twenty-four hours. These reports were required to reach the G-1 section of the army by 1200 hours. Reports were forwarded by the most expeditious means - telephone, radio, or messenger.

The items reported in daily reports were as follows:

- a. Killed in action, died of wounds and injuries.
- b. Wounded and injured in action.
- c. Captured, missing in action, and interned. Personnel lost in action during the day that could not be accounted for and who were not included in the effective strength were reported in this category.
- d. Personnel previously reported missing (DM) who returned to unit control.
- e. Non-battle casualties - personnel hospitalized by reason of illness or injuries received not in action.
- f. Battle and non-battle casualties returned to duty - all RTUs who were dropped from unit rolls as a result of hospitalization. Personnel who had been reported missing in action were not reported as RTU.
- g. Date for period ending 2359 hours.
- h. Assigned strength - all personnel carried on unit rolls as permanent members of the organization.
- i. Effective strength - the assigned strength less hospitalized personnel not dropped from rolls and MIA not dropped from unit rolls. Included were AWOLs, Confined, Temporary Duty in United States, personnel at Rest Centers and Rest Hotels, and on Detached Service. Temporary Duty Personnel to Other Units were reported as effectives by parent units only.

f. Battle and non-battle casualties returned to duty - [confusing, repetitive, but given as printed; no item "j" found]

k. Replacements received - only "new faces" assigned to reporting unit by a replacement depot were included. Former members of the unit were not included in this category, but in one of the other categories.

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It was recognized that these daily reports, because of time lag and the difficulty of securing adequate information during the confusion of battle, were an approximation of the true figures. However, inaccuracies were slight. Comparisons with reports of hospital admissions, of clearing stations, and subsequent strength reports showed a discrepancy of less than one per cent.

In addition to the daily report, a weekly casualty report was submitted to Army by all units. This report totaled battle casualties and non-battle casualties of the unit for the period covered by the report. Figures for infantry were shown as a separate item. Figures for all non-infantry were totaled separately. This report also showed the number of battle casualties and the number of non-battle casualties returned to the unit during the period. Infantry and non-infantry were again shown separately

Bi-monthly reports covered the periods 1st through 15th day of the month and the 16th to the end of the month. These reports showed the status of absentees for the period covered by the report and classified them as follows:

- a. Number of personnel AWOL as of 2359 hours on last day of period.
- b. Number of personnel dropped from rolls as AWOL during period.
- c. Number of AWOLs returned to military control during period.
- d. Total number of cases of AWOL which occurred during the period. Those that went AWOL and returned to military control during period were included.
- e. Number of personnel in confinement on last day of period. All garrison prisoners, persons awaiting trial, and awaiting review of GCM [General Court Martial] were included.
- f. Number of personnel on Temporary Duty in United States on last day of period.
- g. Total number of personnel that departed for rest area, rest center, or rest hotel during period.

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For purposes of control and check, negative reports were required in all instances.

## ***Section 8. AG Casualty Division***

To expedite the handling of all casualty reports and the reporting of casualties to the War Department, the Army AG Section required a casualty division, composed of two officers and twenty enlisted men. The use of day and night shifts made it possible to complete the processing and clearing of casualty reports within 24 hours.

This division processed and cleared all Battle Casualty Reports (MTOUSA Form No. 6), Wounded Progress Reports and Burial Reports (QMS Form No. 1-GRS) originating in the Army.

It also checked all Letter Reports of Death, and kept a suspense file for following up all non-battle deaths to insure prompt forwarding of Service Records and Reports of Investigation (WD AGO Form No. 51), where applicable. Service Records were checked in all cases of death, and in all cases of MIA more than 30 days old. Many MIAs were found to be in Army hospital installations by a daily check against hospitalization cards received from the Army Detachment of Patients. Letters of Inquiry and Condolence were checked before forwarding to next of kin of deceased personnel.

A control over late Battle Casualty Reports was made possible by careful daily analyses. A daily breakdown by classification of casualty supplemented the monthly MRU report.

An additional important function of the AG Casualty Division was to train organizations in the proper preparation of Battle Casualty Reports.

## ***Section 9. Rest Centers***

The establishment and use of rest and recreation centers for both officers and enlisted men demonstrated the value of short periods of relaxation by the noted improvement of morale, and reduction of non-battle casualties occasioned by fatigue, neurosis, and mental exhaustion.

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The better the facilities for sleeping, eating, and recreation and the fewer military restrictions and regulations imposed the greater the benefits derived.

Physical facilities available for rest centers necessarily varied in various localities but certain minimums were found by experience to be essential. The facilities selected must be or must be made to be as nearly comparable to first class civilian accommodations as possible. A hotel or group of hotels is ideal but these are rarely available in sufficient number to accommodate the number of enlisted men it is desired to serve. Comfortable sleeping facilities are important. When it was impossible or impracticable to secure real beds, mattresses of the proper size to fit the regulation canvas cot were procured by local civilian manufacture. An adequate number of blankets or comforters was furnished by the Quartermaster. It is invariably necessary to make extraordinary arrangements for lighting and heating facilities. Electric generators were made available from military sources. In one instance, at the rest center established in Florence, heat was provided from the boiler of a locomotive placed adjacent to the buildings.

In all instances the services of sanitation and bath units and of a complete clothing exchange unit were provided. This was found to be one of the most essential adjuncts to the rest centers. If a soldier was obliged to spend time at the rest center without fresh clothes and adequate bathing facilities, much of the benefit of the rest was lost.

The establishment of the rest center messes required a considerable amount of planning, thought, and experimentation. Messes were set up to approximate as nearly as possible the appointments and

service of a first-class hotel dining room. Fresh linen, dishes, silverware and waiter service were beneficial changes from mess kits and chow lines. Messes were in operation from 0700 to 2200 to accommodate the convenience of the men. It was found desirable to establish eating facilities in addition to the regular messes run in conjunction with the rest center.

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This was done without cost to the government. Suitable civilian restaurants were selected and verbal agreements entered into with the civilian management. After some experimentation a standard arrangement was arrived at which was satisfactory to all concerned. Lunch and supper were served. The soldier patronizing these restaurants was charged a service fee of ten cents per meal. This ten cents was apportioned, seven and one half cents for the management and two and one half cents for a restaurant fund used as a reserve to bolster restaurant operation where necessary. The civilian management was responsible for the complete operation of the restaurant including the hiring of employees. In some instances it was found necessary to supplement the physical equipment of the restaurant with ranges and utensils from army sources. All such installations were closely supervised by the military. Food was provided by daily requisition of the regular ration, based upon an actual head count.

Recreational facilities were an important part of rest center operation. Motion picture theaters were a regular feature as were "live" shows providing U.S.O. or local talent. Libraries and small recreation rooms for table games as well as lounge rooms were provided at each center.

The American Red Cross cooperated in all rest center activities which coincided with the services the Red Cross was prepared to render. Information booths were established. Conducted tours, visiting points of local or historical interest, were regularly scheduled. Transportation for these tours was furnished by the units participating. Red Cross snack bars were established in each center and provided light refreshments throughout the day. A wrapping service for packages was made available. Entertainers strolling about the lounges during the day added an informal note to the entertainment features. Reading and writing rooms with stationery furnished by the Red Cross were a regular feature. A music room with instruments furnished by Special Service and operated under the supervision of the Red Cross was a popular addition.

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Welfare Service was provided by a Field Representative of the Red Cross permanently assigned to the rest center. Dances were a major Red Cross activity.

Each rest center provided complete Post Office facilities and also the services of an Army Finance Officer for partial payments.

In an effort to provide an opportunity to secure local wines and liquors at more reasonable prices and of a better quality than could be obtained elsewhere, bars catering exclusively to enlisted men were established in army rest centers. These were operated as a civilian concession. Prices were controlled by the military and the liquor was tested for purity at the source and again at the bar. The results obtained were good. Men were well behaved and cases of drunkenness rare. In one instance a cabaret type night club was operated under civilian management with military control. The agreement provided for a dance orchestra and floor show each afternoon and evening. Liquor was served at controlled prices. No meals were attempted and the club was closed during the evening meal hours.

The establishment and operation of rest centers was under the direct charge of the Army Special Service Officer. Allotments for the use of the rest center were made by the Army G-1.

It was determined that a period of four days at the rest center accomplished the desired physical and mental rehabilitation. A complete four days' rest was provided with personnel away from their units five days in most instances. Administrative considerations and the necessity of employing all possible economies in the use of transportation dictated that the personnel on rest status be changed all at one time. Under this procedure unit transportation bringing personnel to the rest center returned those leaving.

In January 1945 railway facilities were such that a daily rest center train was inaugurated to take rest center personnel from Montecatini to Rome. Unit quotas arrived at Montecatini in the morning, were served by a bath and clothing exchange unit, given lunch at a rest center restaurant, and loaded on the train for Rome early in the afternoon. They arrived at Rome the following morning.

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Box lunches and coffee was put aboard the train for the evening meal prior to departure. Midway of the seventeen-hour run a short stopover was made at Grosseto where coffee and doughnuts were served by the American Red Cross. Additional coffee was placed on the train at this point. Quartermaster trucks met the train in Rome and transported the "restees" to the rest center where breakfast awaited them. A train commander, train quartermaster, and train surgeon were detailed by the army G-1 for each train.

Officers' rest centers provided essentially the same facilities as those for enlisted men. In all instances it was possible to secure suitable hotel accommodations. There again the civilian management was retained under military supervision wherever possible. Each officer was charged one dollar per day service fee. Twenty five cents of this went toward operating costs and the other seventy five cents was used to supplement the ration mess by local purchases. As and whenever surplus funds accumulated additional services were added - free barber and manicure, free wine with dinner, etc.

Personnel to operate these rest facilities was first taken on temporary duty from the units in the army. This was found to be unsatisfactory. It was too much of a drain on tactical units and was inefficient because of the rapid turnover. Recognizing the need, the Commanding General NATOUSA [North African Theater of Operations, United States Army] authorized the organization of a special service company for this operation. Medical and dental officers and assistants at the rest centers were furnished by the Army Surgeon who detailed personnel to this duty. Units were required to furnish duty officers on the basis of one officer to each fifty men at the rest center. Military Police were furnished in each instance by the City Command.

## ***Section 10. Special Service Activities***

It soon became evident that there were many unforeseen activities in which the Special Service sections at Army, Corps, and Division levels must become engaged if maximum service were to be rendered.

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Previous planning had contemplated that the Special Service Officer at these levels would function in a supervisory capacity only, and that the actual operations would be carried on in the lower units. It was quickly determined that this method of operation was not satisfactory.

It was evident that the Special Service Section of higher headquarters must become actively engaged in the operations phase of the activities undertaken. Special Service warehouses were established by the Army and the several Corps to provide for the breakdown and distribution of Special Service supplies. Division sections in turn accomplished the breakdown and distribution of supplies to subordinate units. Film libraries for the rapid and controlled distribution of motion picture film and the allocation of projectors were established by Army and Corps.

Augmentation of the personnel authorized under tables of organization for Special Service Sections of the Army and the Corps was necessary.

Personnel from Special Service companies were placed on temporary duty as needed with the Special Service Section of Army, and the Section itself was increased to provide for 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Warrant Officer and 9 enlisted men. This increase was allocated from the Army Provisional Overhead Company. Special Service Sections of Corps were increased proportionately by personnel from Corps troops placed on temporary duty with the Corps sections.

Transportation for Special Service activities was provided from unit motor pools.

To coordinate the Special Services for army units not attached to corps, an officer was detailed from each of the services to act as assistant to the Army Special Service Officer. Activities for army engineer units were coordinated through the engineer officer so detailed, for army ordnance units through the ordnance officer so detailed, and similarly for all army units.

Transportation, housing, and feeding of U.S.O. shows and entertainers was undertaken by higher headquarters Special Service.

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Units lower than the divisions were not able to provide adequate facilities, and in some instances facilities could not be provided in any echelon lower than the army. The necessary facilities were usually provided by opening and operating hotels and rooming houses under the direction of Special Service Personnel.

## ***Section 11. Chaplain Activities***

Complete chaplain coverage, especially for separate battalions having no authorized chaplain, was obtained only by cooperative efforts on the part of assigned chaplains. Service was rendered on an area coverage rather than on a strict organizational plan. Without neglecting their responsibility to the unit to which they were assigned, chaplains served troops within reasonable distances. Such services were coordinated by the staff chaplains of Army, Corps, and Divisions, each within his own area.

The necessity for providing prompt and complete religious solace to the sick and wounded was recognized. The table of organization for small evacuation hospitals provided for only one chaplain. An additional chaplain was placed on duty with each of these hospitals so that both Protestant and Catholic patients received the ministrations of a chaplain of their own faith.

The Army chaplain's section was augmented by three enlisted men from the Army Provisional Overhead Company. Two of these men were clerks. One was an interpreter. In all occupied areas direct contact between local church officials and the Army chaplain was inevitable and greatly to be desired. The interpreter in the chaplain section was indispensable in facilitating this contact.

A fund was established with the Purchasing and Contracting Quartermaster for the local purchase of expendable chaplain supplies such as flags, rosaries, communion wine, etc., which otherwise would have had to be shipped from the United States.

An attempt was made to establish an Army pool of chaplains for the purpose of quickly providing replacements for casualties and for providing chaplain coverage for isolated units and separate battalions not authorized chaplains.

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Five per cent of the chaplain strength authorized for the entire Army, in proper proportion of faiths, was deemed desirable for this surplus. The plan was not successful because of the lack of available chaplains.

The shortage of negro chaplains in the Fifth Army to serve non-divisional negro troops was met in part by chaplains borrowed from the pool of chaplains maintained by MTOUSA [Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army].

## ***Section 12. Awards and Decorations***

The administrative processing of recommendations and the necessity of maintaining a uniform standard for the award of all decorations required the establishment of new methods and controls throughout all echelons of command from the regiments to the army.

An officer was added to the regimental adjutant's section as Awards and Decorations Officer. Through him were processed all recommendations for awards. He checked them for administrative correctness and passed them on to an awards board. The composition of this board varied among units and changed within units from time to time, but in most cases included the regimental executive officer, the adjutant, and a third officer selected for his experience and judgement. This board passed on the suitability of the recommended award under the policies and standards established by Army Regulations and directives from higher headquarters. The findings of the board were sent to the regimental commander for final approval or rejection of the recommendation.

Similar controls were established in the headquarters of each division. Procedures in the various divisions varied only in detail. In most cases the awards officer was established as a part of the G-1 section. In

others he functioned as a part of the Adjutant General's section. All divisions found that an awards board was essential.

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The board varied somewhat in personnel but usually the Chief of Staff, the G-1, and one other officer constituted the membership. In each case recommendations were made by the board to the Commanding General who personally passed on each recommendation.

The procedures in corps headquarters were essentially the same as those in divisions.

At the army level, an awards division was established as a part of the Adjutant General's section. The awards board was made up of representative officers from various arms and services. This board met in actual session with the awards officer for discussion of each case. In lower echelons the boards seldom met together. The recommendations of each member were indicated by notations on a prepared cover sheet which was circulated with the pertinent papers in each case.

In all headquarters it was found necessary to provide the awards officer with enlisted assistants to do the clerical work and to write or rewrite citations.

Throughout the entire campaign the necessity for constantly urging combat commanders to make recommendations for awards was evident. There was a persistent tendency to delay the recognition of acts of heroism or merit until the unit had entered a period of rest. Unit commanders were constantly reminded of the morale value of a decoration promptly awarded.

### ***Section 13. Military Justice***

Previous conceptions of the means and methods necessary for administering military justice were found to be based on an erroneous conception of the magnitude of the problem involved. Planning had been based on the expectation that each division normally would handle twelve to fifteen General Court Martial cases in any one month. Judge Advocate sections in divisions, corps, and armies were organized accordingly. Early in the campaign it was found that the figure considered normal was far too low. Some divisions faced the necessity of disposing of ten times the number of cases expected.

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In order to handle this unexpected number of cases augmentation of JAG sections was necessary.

The Army Commander authorized an increase in the Judge Advocate General's Section of the army to provide for a Trial Judge Advocate and assistant and a Defense Counsel on a full-time basis. Divisions likewise added Trial Judge Advocates and Defense Counsels to their staff Judge Advocate's Sections. The problem as it applied to corps was not as acute, and cases were normally handled expeditiously without an increase in personnel.

An additional burden was placed on the offices of Judge Advocates because of the lack of trained personnel in the subordinate units where charges originated. A large proportion of cases forwarded were legally insufficient. Many incomplete or legally worthless reports of investigations were received. The legal

errors in trials required an immense amount of correction. The need in all units down to and including the separate battalion for legally trained personnel familiar with the technicalities of Court procedure was demonstrated. It was difficult and impractical to train line officers in the technicalities of Courts Martial. The necessity for using unqualified personnel made impossible the expeditious handling of the large volume of legal business.

Part of the large number of General Courts Martial cases was occasioned by the reluctance of unit commanders to use Special Courts. This reluctance was the result of a general policy which discouraged the confinement of persons sentenced to less than six months, and the physical difficulty of providing a proper place for confinement of garrison prisoners. In consequence many cases which could have been handled by a Special Court were referred to General Courts.

Throughout the entire campaign the shortage of trained court stenographers was a continuing problem throughout all echelons exercising General Court Martial jurisdiction. This was occasioned by an actual shortage of trained personnel, and aggravated by the fact that other staff sections were authorized higher ratings than were provided in the Judge Advocates Sections.

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Officers were found reluctant to refuse to concur in the transfer of an enlisted man when the transfer offered a promotion.

The practice of delaying the trial of General Court Martial cases pending a period of rest for the unit concerned was found to be impracticable. Witnesses had been killed or moved out of the practicable jurisdiction of the court, and the number of accumulated cases was beyond the ability of the court to handle during the time allotted. It was found necessary to withdraw interested persons from units actually in the line in order to expedite the disposal of court martial cases.

The long distances involved required many personal contacts in the field by the Trial Judge Advocates and the Defense Counsels to prepare cases properly. The normal practice of sending for witnesses by phone or letter prior to trial was found to be impracticable.

## ***Section 14. Mail***

### ***1. APOs [Army Post Offices]***

The selection of locations for APOs serving corps and Army was based on considerations of ability to render maximum efficient service and convenience.

APOs serving the Army and corps headquarters were located with the rear echelon of the headquarters to which they were assigned. A money order and stamp unit normally operated with the forward echelons.

General assignment APOs serving Army and corps troops were located in areas where the maximum number of troops could be served. Frequently this was in the vicinity of the Class I supply dump.

A location near a dump was not important, however. The pickup of mail by ration trucks was found to be undesirable and impracticable. Mail was picked up by units from the APOs as a separate function.

Mail received by base post offices for delivery to troops in the Army area was forwarded to the Army Postal Regulating Section by truck or by air.

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The Army Postal Regulating Section, by means of truck transportation, furnished by the Army, forwarded mail to truckhead APOs for pickup by corps and division APOs. In some cases it was feasible for the Army Postal Regulating Section to deliver directly to corps or division APOs. This was done wherever practicable. Separate Army units were served by Army truckhead APOs.

## **2. *Organization***

Personnel authorized the Army Postal Regulating Section (T/O&E 12-602, 28 Sept. 1944), proved to be inadequate. This section initially had to provide guards on all vehicles delivering mail from the Postal Regulating section. The assignment of Army Military Police to the Regulating Section partially alleviated this condition. It was necessary, however, for one trained mail clerk to accompany the mail to each APO destination to handle registered mail. Additional personnel as required were placed on detached service with the Regulating Section by the Army.

Tables of organization and equipment of postal regulating sections and large type army postal units had been drawn up with the expectation that the personnel of such units would always be attached to some other unit for rations. That procedure was found to be impracticable. It restricted the location of the unit, prevented its free movement, and caused undesirable confusion because of the necessity of feeding a fluctuating number of drivers and mail guards. The Army authorized an augmentation of personnel and equipment to the Army Postal Regulating Section and to one Army postal unit (Type J) to make them self sustaining.

## **3. *Hospital Delivery***

It was found desirable for morale purposes to deliver mail to patients in clearing companies, field hospitals, and evacuation hospitals. Mail was not delivered through normal APO channels to patients in such installations because they usually remained there only a few days.

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Divisions, however, attempted to get mail to these patients wherever practicable. Daily information was supplied from the division clearing company

Admission and Disposition sheets to determine the medical installation in which members of the division were hospitalized. Personal delivery was then made daily by personnel of the division APO. Check was made with the registrar's files at each installation to verify the presence of the individual and to determine the ward in which he was housed. If the patient had been evacuated to another Army medical installation, delivery was made to him there. If evacuated to a station or general hospital the mail was returned to the unit and forwarded through normal APO channels. About seventy-five per cent of the attempted deliveries

were completed. This procedure normally required that two additional enlisted men and a 1/4 ton truck be assigned to the division APO.

## **Section 15. Post Exchanges and Officers' Sales Stores**

Post exchange operations were organized within the army to bring post exchange service to the front lines, and to make the staple and luxury items offered available to the combat soldier at all times.

All units of the army were served by a post exchange warehouse controlled by the Base Section and staffed by a Base Section Sales Platoon. Plans were made by the army to establish a post exchange warehouse under army control with a Sales Company assigned to the army. Non-availability of such a unit for assignment to army prevented the accomplishment of this plan. Close liaison and complete cooperation between the army post exchange officers and the Base Section were responsible for the satisfactory operation of the warehouse.

Items available to unit post exchanges were issued from the warehouse on a ration basis to unit post exchange officers, as designated by unit commanders. This ration was established in accordance with War Department directives and the availability of supplies, based on the strength of the unit, and covered a half-month period.

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Unit post exchange officers operated on a twenty-one day credit at the warehouse. Normally the post exchange officer for each major unit drew supplies for all subordinate units. The division post exchange officer drew supplies for the entire division. Within the division area these supplies were broken down for subordinate units, and issued to the unit post exchange officers who in turn broke them down for smaller units until they reached the company or even platoon level.

Issues at the warehouse were not automatic but were based on orders submitted in advance by the unit post exchange officer. Post exchange officers ordered such items as met their requirements within the limits of the ration. In all instances a certification of the strength of the unit was required.

The list of articles available from the United States was augmented by local purchases. Souvenirs and gifts were procured locally. By purchasing directly from the manufacturers in quantity the post exchange was able to offer many such items to the soldier at a savings of approximately fifty per cent. Some items which were received from the United States in very limited quantities were secured locally by arrangement for their manufacture. This usually required cooperation with the manufacturer to get his plant in order, efforts to secure electric power for him, and the release of raw materials frozen by AMG [Allied Military Government]. Cigarette lighters were procured in this manner.

Three officers' sales stores were established in convenient locations, one in each corps area, one in Army area. These stores sold necessary items of clothing and equipment to officers and nurses. Their operation was under the direction of the army post exchange officer who designated responsibility for individual stores in corps areas to the corps post exchange officer. More stores would have been desirable but were impossible of establishment because of lack of operating personnel.

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Personnel for the operation of the post exchange service within all units of the army were secured from units of the army. As required, enlisted men were placed on detached service with the army post exchange officer. This was undesirable because of the personnel drain on units and the frequent changes necessary.

A captain and lieutenant were authorized the army from theater overhead as post exchange officer and assistant.

[end of chapter]

[The document as presented here is - within the limits of my vision, alertness, and stamina - an accurate rendering of the original; but it is not a "true copy". Occasional misspellings and typographic errors in the original have been corrected. Further annotations - primarily abbreviation and acronym expansions - and insertions of clearly dropped words appear in 'square brackets'.

- Patrick Skelly, for milhist.net]

[Transcribed 2001-11-07]