

A Military Encyclopedia

Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.

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Chapter Eight

SUPPLY

[Note: charts and forms of the original document have been reformatted here, without loss of information, for convenience of presentation. Each such document is delimited by "======" at top and bottom.]

Section 1. Supply, Administration, and Evacuation (SAE) Instructions

The publishing of consecutive Army Administrative Instructions in a numbered series, referring to and/or rescinding previous related or conflicting instructions, was discontinued after one year of active operations in the Italian theater. It became increasingly difficult to locate and piece together a complete picture of current policy on any one subject, since policies of many services and on many subjects were in each of the numerous Administrative Instructions.

Through the combined effort of the Army G-4 [Supply] Section and the Army AG [Adjutant General] Section there was devised the Army "SAE Instructions" publication. Fifth Army Supply, Administration, and Evacuation Instructions were kept in "looseleaf" form, so that individual sheets could be added, or substituted for old sheets. Besides reducing the size by over fifty per cent, this publication had other inherent advantages over the system of publishing consecutive Administrative Instructions in a numbered series:

- a. Policies on each subject were complete in one place.
- b. Rescinded policy did not accumulate.
- c. Permanent cross-indexing could be made, as each subject was assigned a permanent section number.
- d. "Posting" of revised and rescinded instructions was unnecessary.
- e. The assignment of permanent section numbers to each subject permitted indexing.

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Section 2. Average Daily Consumption of Supplies, Anzio Beachhead

The average daily consumption of supplies by U.S. Forces, Anzio Beachhead, is given below, computed on the basis of supplies required by an average strength of 85,000 over the representative period of 1 to 15 February 1944. During this period the situation was relatively static, combat was defensive with occasional sorties and counter-attacks, and the enemy airforce was very active.

Pounds per man per day [categorized by type and source]:

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CLASS I

Chemical Warfare	-
Engineer	-
Medical	-
Ordnance	-
Quartermaster	6.26
Signal	-
Total	6.26 (15.8%)

CLASSES II and IV

Chemical Warfare	0.027
Engineer	0.80 (b)
Medical	0.11
Ordnance	1.33 (a)
Quartermaster	0.85
Signal	0.003
Total	3.120 (7.6%)

CLASS III

Chemical Warfare	-
Engineer	-
Medical	-
Ordnance	-
Quartermaster	3.56 (c)
Signal	-
Total	3.56 (9.0%)

CLASS V

Chemical Warfare	0.80
Engineer	0.03
Medical	-
Ordnance	25.80
Quartermaster	-
Signal	-
Total	26.63 (67.3%)

Totals

Chemical Warfare	0.827 (2.1%)
Engineer	0.83 (2.1%)
Medical	0.11 (0.3%)
Ordnance	27.13 (68.5%)
Quartermaster	10.67 (27.0%)
Signal	0.003 (0.0%)
Total	39.570 (100.0%)

(a) Includes Major Replacement Items.

(b) Principally fortification materials: wire, sandbags, and lumber.

(c) Based on strength of 110,000 (British and U.S.)

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The above series of figures, added to similar figures for British troops in the Beachhead, indicates the tremendous problem that was overcome to provide daily maintenance alone, which, when added to build up requirements, dictated that at least 25,000 tons be off-loaded daily.

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Section 3. Supply Over Beaches in a Landing Against Opposition

1. General

Task Force commanders were responsible, through assigned Beach Groups, for receiving and stocking supplies at the beaches, and, through organic service units for issuing them to the combat elements. Task forces at Salerno were prepared to be supplied over the beaches up to and including the "D plus 12" convoy. After the passage inland of the assault troops, control of the beaches passed to the Beach Group commanders. Then, as soon as the tactical situation allowed, Army assumed complete control. When this occurred, a Transportation Section which Fifth Army had previously constituted and organized as a Special Staff Section, began operating under control of G-4. This new section was charged with the unloading of all ships and crafts, the establishing and operating of rail facilities, and with the control of all Army truck transportation. From the beach forward, supply was accomplished by Divisions, Corps, and Army in their respective zones of action, while resupply, a function of Army, was handled by drawing from North Africa or directly from the Zone of Interior. To expedite resupply, an Army Base Area Section was formed to control and operate ports, rail transportation, base depots, fixed bed hospitals, and other base area installations.

2. Beach Organization

a. *Beaches* - Chart I shows the beachhead used in the initial landing at Salerno which was made against considerable opposition. The general layout and organization is shown on the chart. Two additional beaches were used after the beachhead was firmly secured.

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[" **Chart (Map) I: The Paestum Beaches: 9 September 1943** " is not included at this time
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b. *Beach Control* - The Navy Beachmaster controlled all operational landings and maintained communications between ship and shore. A Port Headquarters, which operated two Port Battalions, controlled and coordinated all ship unloadings, while the Engineer Shore Regiments were the pivots around which all supply operations revolved.

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Two of these regiments operated all the beaches and unloaded craft at the beaches.

c. *Organization* - Chart II shows the organization of a typical landing beach for the supply of one combat team. The LCTs and LCMs unloaded on the beaches, while the LSTs discharged their cargoes on a floating dock connected by a ramp to the beaches. DUKWs which operated from ship to shore carried supplies direct to the dumps established inland. Summerfeld track was laid generally as shown to provide footing.

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[" **Chart (Map) II: Typical Landing Beach for the Supply of One Combat Team** " is not included at this time.]
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d. *Reports from Beaches* - Information on the beach operations was submitted daily by Corps to Army through the medium of daily sitreps. These reports covered the daily ship and craft unloading, tonnage, casualties, prisoners of war, personnel disembarked, and events of administrative interest.

3. *Operation*

a. *Installations* - Initially, all administrative installations on the beach, including dumps and clearing stations, were controlled and operated by the Beach Groups. Installations forward of the beach were under the control of Combat Teams, Divisions, Corps, and later Army.

b. *Communications* -

(1) *Water* - The Navy operated all shipping. The convoys carrying the assault units and maintenance supplies from North Africa arrived at the designated beachhead on a definite schedule. Initial and first follow-up convoys of U.S. troops were combat loaded, while subsequent convoys were "ship

to shore" loaded. Convoys for continued maintenance supplies arrived at objectives from both North Africa and the Zone of Interior.

(2) *Roads* - Task Force commanders in their respective zones of action designated main supply routes, established priorities, restrictions, and traffic control.

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Roads from the beaches were constructed and maintained.

(3) *Rail* - An attempt was made to use rail transportation during the initial phase of the operation, and every effort was made to prevent destruction to existing lines and rolling stock.

(4) *Ports* - The use of ports was included in the original plan, but the main port was not captured on schedule. Construction equipment and supplies to rehabilitate this main port were kept immediately available on call.

(5) *Air* - The plan did not contemplate supply by Air Transport in the initial landing except for Airborne elements. Airfields were immediately constructed on the beachhead.

c. *Supply* - Supply was organized so that the initial assault convoy carried:

(1) Seven days Class I supplies for all U.S. troops, including one gallon of water per man per day for all purposes for four days.

(2) Class II assault packs for individual equipment (QM, Ord, Med, CWS) at 5% of the assault strength. These were additional supplies based on 5% of the assault force. Ordnance spare parts were carried by units. All other service supplies were provided at a seven-day combat maintenance level.

(3) Enough Class III fuel and oil for seven days, based on a 50-mile operational day for all vehicles of the Task Force and Airforce ground vehicles.

(4) Enough Class IV Engineer construction materiel for initial construction and maintenance of beach roads and landing field development.

(5) 2-1/3 units of fire of Class V supplies.

Follow-up convoys provided normal combat maintenance supplies. Airforce technical supplies were provided through Airforce supply channels. Supplies common to both Airforce and Army, such as rations and vehicle fuel, were supplied to the Airforce by Army.

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d. *Evacuation* - Initial evacuation of casualties was accomplished by both air and water, depending on the availability of each class of transportation. Adequate hospitalization was established on the objective as soon as possible

Burial was by unit assisted by the available Graves Registration personnel.

Prisoners of war were initially evacuated to beaches by units, then to North Africa by returning transport.

Evacuation of salvage and captured enemy materiel was a unit responsibility. Evacuation to beach or to railhead, truckhead, or Base Area was accomplished by using returning supply transportation; and from the objective to North Africa or the Zone of Interior by returning ships.

Section 4. Stacking of Combustible Commodities in Depots Subject to Enemy Fire or Bombing

Based on experiments and operations at Anzio, the following procedure was adopted in an effort to further conserve combustible stocks during the heavy shelling and bombing encountered in this operation.

Each stack of ammunition and gasoline was stacked compactly and then banked with dirt by a bulldozer to the height of the stack. Then if the stack was fired it burned slowly, since the supply of oxygen was cut off except from the top surface of the stack. By shoveling dirt over the rest of the stack the fire was promptly smothered in a short period of time, and with a minimum of loss.

Section 5. Control of Excess Equipment

The first step that was taken to control the issue of equipment in excess of T/E [Table of Equipment] was the publication, in Administrative Instructions, of information concerning the principles governing such issues and the procedures for obtaining them. The purpose of this was to establish a preliminary screen to filter out requests for excess equipment arising from fancied or unimportant needs.

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It was intended that each succeeding headquarters evaluate requests in the light of operational necessity and make appropriate recommendations.

When requests reached the Army G-4 Section they were fully investigated and given a final evaluation. In urgent cases, when issue could not await approval from higher headquarters, a special authorization memorandum was published by Army Headquarters permitting immediate issue for a limited period. When excess issues were approved by MTOUSA [Mediterranean Theater of Operation, United States Army] or the War Department, equipment augmentation letters were published to the troops concerned.

A "tickler" file was maintained in the G-4 Section to assure return of such excess equipment to Army stock automatically on or before the expiration date. This file provided a four-way cross reference so that a clerk could check the status of all excess equipment due to be returned to stock on any particular day. Thus the failure of any unit to return equipment when due was known immediately. Such units were notified by

form letter of their delinquency and were given ten days in which to comply. If they persisted in their delinquency a second letter of a command nature was sent through command channels.

Units turning in equipment were required to send true copies of the tally-in or the shipping ticket to the G-4 Section in order to enable that Section to clear its file.

When the need for excess equipment continued beyond the expiration date of the original authority, requests for extension were made in the same manner as the original requests.

Section 6. Reorganization of Units in a Combat Zone

From the supply viewpoint, the reorganization of any unit in a combat zone was no problem provided the equipment authorized on the new T/O&E [Table of Organization and Equipment] was available. [p.354]

Too often, however, units were ordered to reorganize before the supplies to accomplish the reorganization were available. When such was the case, substitutions were necessary until such time as the new equipment became available. Units as large as a regiment were reorganized without drawing the unit out of the line, but more often reorganization was best accomplished when the unit was back for rest and rehabilitation.

Section 7. Utilization of Local Resources in a Foreign Country

In order to decrease requirements for shipping materials and equipment from the U.S., considerable use was made by the Army of civilian resources. Supplies from local sources were used, critical items and maintenance parts were manufactured in local shops, and industrial gas and cement requirements were met by operation of local plants. In some cases the actual welfare of the troops was directly dependent upon the availability of certain resources, such as coal, fire wood, and cold storage and dry cleaning plants.

The extensive exploitation of local resources in a foreign country had to be carefully controlled. This control was exercised by the Army G-4 Section in connection with Allied Military Government by issuing "blocking orders" for certain resources as needed by AMG for civilian use, and by Army for military use. Unfortunately, neither G-4 Section nor AMG had a sufficient number of trained personnel to control completely local resources. Often frequently needed materials were not declared on inventories and sufficient police personnel were not always available to prevent some loss of critical materials to Black Market organizations.

Section 8. Real Estate Problems

After almost a year's experience it was found most efficient to centralize responsibility for all real estate activities in territories occupied by Army. To deal with these matters, a separate Real Estate Division was established in the Army Engineer Section.

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The Army Engineer was responsible for all real estate activities in the Army Area, but delegated it to subordinate Corps within their boundaries. On its release by the Army commander, Base Section assumed control for real estate for which Army had no further use.

Before Real Estate planning was inaugurated, units moved up independently and reconnoitered rapidly for a bivouac without any thought as to where closely related services might be located. Consequently, many small organizations occupied areas which were ideal for hospitals or depots. Each unit merely located itself and reported the fact to G-4. Consequently, bivouacs frequently had to be rearranged and units moved to new locations, resulting in delay and confusion. It was soon learned that each advance by Army demanded careful planning prior to actual occupation so that general locations for each of the vital supply services could be determined well in advance. This was done initially with the aid of air photographs and maps. As soon as the tactical situation permitted, ground reconnaissance was made.

Agencies interested in locations in new areas presented their requirements to the Real Estate Officer well in advance. If they failed to do so, they were nevertheless assumed to require accommodations, and installations for them were included in the development plan submitted to G-4. Each unit was notified and in most cases approved the arrangement, and later used the accommodation. This service was also rendered to units outside the Army.

Requests that areas be reserved well in advance of actual occupancy were received from time to time. These were generally for airfields, gasoline storage dumps, rest camps, and staging areas. When such requests were approved, care was exercised to keep the area reserved until the applicant was ready to use it. This necessitated a "future" file and map indications. Very often units from higher echelons were interested in a piece of property occupied by Army elements and requested that the property be turned over to them when released. Such requests were forwarded to the proper allocating agency of the relieving Base Section.

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The Real Estate Officer moved to a central location in the new development area in advance of the service elements. His office was set up with the necessary maps, plans, records, etc. The operation of getting elements into the area then commenced. Each of the services sent a representative to the Real Estate Office to obtain final information and formal allocation and requisition papers. As a rule, an average of approximately 250 to 300 individual requests were handled. They were reviewed in the light of the overall plan and their most effective location from an operational viewpoint.

All requests for odd lots or buildings were processed individually. After the location was approved it was registered and formal requisition papers were issued in quadruplicate. When the necessary information was filled in, the papers were returned to the Real Estate Office for final approval, signature, and seal. Occupant's copy, property owner's copy, and building registration card were handed back to the person desiring accommodations. He was then ready to occupy, merely posting the card on the premises and giving the property owner his copy of the requisition for presentation to the Italian Claims Department.

Cancellation of an approved requisition was sometimes necessary. Occasionally there was a necessity for removing one type of service to accommodate a higher priority unit, such as a hospital.

Evictions usually occurred when a unit occupied premises without proper authorization. The Real Estate Officer relied on the Provost Marshal and the Corps of Military Police for checking unauthorized occupancies. The Provost Marshal in many cases was given valuable assistance by reserve combat units used as Special Police and by civilian police under AMG control. Every 24 hours the Provost Marshal was furnished with a list of allocations for checking purposes. The Military Police were able to identify authorized occupancies by a numbered card bearing the official Engineer seal. If the unit occupying the premises displayed no card, it was given two hours' notice and then evicted.

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When Army moved on and Base Section took over, there was a period of closing out. Army elements proceeded to dispose of holdings, and each of the former occupants began to send their processed requisitions in to the Real Estate Office. These were then gathered in groups, re-checked, forwarding papers attached, and the forms sent through channels to the Italian Engineer Board for adjustment of claims. Outstanding requisitions for property to remain occupied by Army units in the Base Section were turned over to Base with the understanding that Army units would not be disturbed until operations compelled them to move.

Section 9. Problems Concerning the Requisition of Facilities and Payment for Local Supplies and Services

Requisitioning of civilian facilities was necessary in many instances:

- a. To supply units actively engaged in combat.
- b. To supply units requiring gravel, sand, cement, building blocks, steel trusses, road graders, rollers, and other items used for building, rebuilding, and repairing roads, bridges, airfields, and public utilities.
- c. To provide real estate for military purposes.
- d. To obtain machinery and equipment for use in work shops, factories, etc., taken over and operated by the military.
- e. To supply gas, water, electricity, and telegraph and telephone services.

For *c* and *d* above, reimbursement was made by the Italian Government based on information contained in the real estate forms processed on the property. For *c* above, reimbursement was made by the Italian Government through the Allied Commission, and private persons presented their requests for payment to that organization.

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Civilian facilities we required were requisitioned with or without the consent of the owner, and without regard to their presence or absence.

All classes of supply and labor were purchased by agent finance officers. As there were no authorized limited depositories, disbursing officers were unable to carry bank balances and pay obligations by check, and a general policy of cash payment for civilian labor and local supplies was followed. Agent finance officers made such payments from appropriate funds previously allocated by Army. When the agent was unable to arrive at fair prices, the local Army AMG was asked to suggest a price scale to be used as a guide in order to avoid inflation caused by over-payment.

Section 10. Supply Problems in Connection with Employment of Italian Troops

The utilization in Fifth Army of the Italian Armed Forces who were converted from an enemy to a co-belligerent status immediately presented difficult problems of logistics. It was found impossible to maintain combat elements adequately with Italian equipment. It was unsatisfactory to scour captured dumps for ammunition for Italian weapons. Maintenance and replacement were either non-existent or unsatisfactory. Service Troops, however, were used by the U.S. Fifth Army forces. Some Italian combat elements were equipped and maintained by the British [Eighth Army] Forces in Italy.

Fifth Army was responsible for the supply, maintenance, and evacuation of almost all Italian Armed Forces operating under its command or with it in the Army Area. A few units were supplied their individual clothing and equipment, organizational equipment, and medical supplies by the Italian War Ministry. These were guard and hospital units and represented only a small percentage of the total Italian Military troops with the U.S. Forces in Fifth Army.

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The War Department authorized the loan of certain U.S. items to Italian units. Other necessary items were to be obtained by the Italian War Ministry from military stocks recovered in the liberated areas.

The War Department authorized the issue of dyed (dark green) Class "X" clothing (beyond economical repair for use by U.S. troops). This clothing was distributed through Army Quartermaster installations, which also maintained a 30-day reserve level.

Details of ration components were established in which certain items were to be supplied from U.S. sources and certain others from local sources. Many difficulties were encountered in obtaining the Italian items and when these items were unavailable the ration proved insufficient.

The utilization of Italian Military Troops was not entirely efficient because of the difficulties encountered in the supply and maintenance of these troops.

Section 11. Supply Problems in Connection with Employment of U.S. Equipped Foreign Troops

U.S.-equipped foreign troops (French and Brazilian) were concerned with certain items of supply peculiar to their nationality. The items fell within Quartermaster Class I, II, and IV supplies. The French used about 50% U.S. rations, and the remainder, which consisted largely of wine, brandy, fish, and flour, were supplied through their own sources. The Brazilians used about 90% U.S. rations with a few additions such as rice, beans, and coffee from their own sources. Brazilian requirements for Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies were supplied approximately 50% from U.S. sources and the remainder from their own sources.

Both the French and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force established Base Depots to handle those items which they supplied from their own sources, but neither ran separate truckheads in Army Area.

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Detachments were furnished to U.S. truckheads to handle the special items as well as the U.S. supplies required to service their own troops.

Section 12. Organization for Supplies in an Army Composed of Allied Troops

The supply system of the British Army and its Dominion Armies was entirely different from that of the United States Army. Therefore, when an Army was composed of Allied troops, separate organizations of supply were maintained for both British and U.S. troops. The British made available to the Fifth Army a "vertical slice" of their organization. This was known as the British Increment and close liaison was maintained between the two supply headquarters.

When Allied troops were U.S.-equipped, and trained in U.S. supply procedures, as was the case with the French and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, few difficulties were encountered by U.S. supply agencies in maintaining these troops in combat. There was always a small language difficulty, but this was no major problem from the supply viewpoint, due to the fact that English-speaking liaison officers were provided. Special items peculiar to both the French and the Brazilians were supplied through their own supply system which functioned similar to the U.S. system. Some difficulties were encountered with separate "Base" Dumps, particularly with Lend-Lease accounting and mal-distribution of items in short supply, but these were worked out satisfactorily.

[end of chapter]

[The document as presented here is - within the limits of the my vision, alertness, and stamina - an accurate rendering of the original; but it is not a "true copy". Occasional misspellings and typographic errors in the original have been corrected. Further annotations - primarily abbreviation and acronym expansions - and insertions of clearly dropped words appear in 'square brackets'.

- Patrick Skelly, for milhist.net]

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