

**Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.
Is 'War' an Appropriate Response?
Is 'War' the Proper Word?**

Patrick G Skelly

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

- President George W. Bush (2001a), 11 September 2001

Since nobody wins, and it never ends, maybe we should stop calling it a War.

- Tobias Zachary Ziegler (2005), 19 January 2005

President George W. Bush (2001c), speaking to the Members of Congress and his fellow Americans on September 20, 2001, said, "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." This action is now widely characterized as the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).

But the nature and variety of GWOT operations and concerns extend far beyond the U.S. Army (DA, 1993) definition of war in Field Manual 100-5, Operations:

war: a state of open and declared armed hostile conflict between political units such as states or nations; may be limited or general in nature.

This paper builds upon the thought by Worley (2003) that "... concepts on the use of force and the well-established language of international relations are inadequate to the current 'war on terrorism'."

After investigating the proper definitions of 'war' and 'terrorism', principal questions to be investigated are the nature of operations and activities carried on under the umbrella of GWOT, whether there is a reasonable nomenclature. and whether there is any expectation for change in this regard.¹

WAR

The Army definition, again, is that war is "a state of open and declared armed hostile conflict between political units such as states or nations; may be limited or general in nature."

The Department of Defense seems not to have defined war; it appears in neither the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS, 2005) nor Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (JCS, 1997). Nor is such a definition found in the more

obvious places within the tens of thousands of pages of our DOD Joint Doctrine publications.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1961 edition, defines war in two senses:

War(1):

- a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between political units ([such] as states or nations);
- a period of armed conflict between political units;
- a legal state which formally comes into being by formal declaration regardless of whether armed hostilities have taken place, must be officially declared at an end by a similar declaration, and is usually characterized by such conditions that the rights and duties of belligerents to act under the rules of international law applicable to war arise.

War(2):

- a state of hostility, conflict, opposition, or antagonism between mental, physical, social, or other forces;
- a struggle of any degree of intensity carried on between opposing forces ([such] as desires, social groups, or physical forces) in a particular field or by a particular means or for a particular goal.

War, in Webster's two senses, ranges from 'nuclear Armageddon' in War(1) down to 'war against mosquitos' or 'war between the sexes' or a 'gas price war' in War(2). Keep in mind the distinctions between War(1) and War(2), as they are referred to below.

TERROR / TERRORIST / TERRORISM

For these words and this purpose, the common meanings ought to suffice;

- Terror: extreme fear.
- Terrorism: the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.
- Terrorist: a person who uses terrorism in the pursuit of political aims.

John Lynn (2003. p. 323), in Battle, expands thoughtfully on terrorism:

At base, creating a definition on terrorism within the broader discourse on war is an effort at definition. However, terrorism is very difficult if not impossible to define in a precise, dictionary manner, because the term encompasses such a variety of motives, actions, and actors. Less as a dictionary definition and more as a conceptual device to help determine what is and is not terrorism, I would describe it as follows:

Terrorism exhibits four traits:

- 1) the use of violence or the threat of violence;
- 2) directed against those unable or unprepared to defend themselves;

- 3) primarily to create fear;
- 4) with the intention of affecting community action or public policy.

But beyond definitions and conceptual analysis, we need to ask whether terrorism is inherently evil? It all depends on your perspective and agenda.

To the Loyalists, the Boston Tea Party was an act of terrorism. To the Rebels, the founders of our present country, it was an act of political and economic protest / boycott.

The Revolutionary War fighting style of the Colonial 'Rebel' militias was considered unfair, terroristic, by the soldiers of the Crown. But to the militiamen it was simply making do with what little they had and what they knew. Today we would think of it as somewhat akin to guerrilla warfare.

To black Americans, Republicans, and immigrants, the Ku Klux Klan members were terrorists. To the - once again - Rebels, Southern this time, it was the organization that sought for the South the protectionism of white government - i.e., 'home rule' - and ran out the 'carpetbaggers'.

"WAR" OR A "NATIONAL EMERGENCY"?

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States of America states that:

The Congress shall have power ... to declare wars; ... to raise and support armies; ... to provide and maintain a navy; ... to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; etc.

Under that provision for our governance, we are not now in a state of war.

President George W. Bush (2001b), by a Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorist Attacks, proclaimed on 14 September 2001 that:

A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Now, therefore, I, George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, I hereby declare that the national emergency has existed since September 11, 2001. ...

"(GLOBAL) WAR ON/AGAINST TERROR..."

The phrase 'Global War on/against Terror/Terrorism' has seldom been used by the President in major public addresses, such as State of The Union Addresses; he generally omits the 'Global'.

Analyzing White House archives (Bush, 2006c), we find that emphasis on the pivotal words has declined over time:

- 'war': 12 instances in 2002, down to 2 in 2006;
- 'terror', 'terrorism', or 'terrorist': 36 instances in 2002, down to 20 in 2006.
- 'war on/against terror/terrorism': 5 instances in 2002, none in 2006.

In less formal addresses President Bush is a heavy user of 'war on terror'. In his recent address to the National Guard Association (Bush, 2006b), there were fifteen instances of 'war on terror', including:

Because [the terrorists] lack the military strength to challenge us directly, they have turned to the weapon of fear. They seek to break our will with stunning acts of violence. They don't understand America. They cannot shake our will. We will stay on the hunt, we will never give in, and we will win this war on terror.

Perhaps the phrase is audience-targeted: the country may be tired of it, while the military still needs to be pumped up. Yet GWOT has been common usage by others in the Executive Office, and by the press and historians who are writing about it.

In the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) there is only one reference in text (others are found in notes, headings and titles) to 'war against terrorism':

Rice prepared a paper that President Bush then considered with principals on Monday morning, September 17 [2001]. "The purpose of this meeting," he recalled saying, "is to assign tasks for the first wave of the war against terrorism. It starts today." (p. 333)

"LONG WAR"

A new banner, 'Long War', has simmered for several years - the first datable instance of use by a government official was 13 April 2004: President Bush (2004) in a national press conference that evening:

We are in a long war. The war on terror is not going to end immediately. This is a war against people who have no guilt in killing innocent people. That's what they're willing to do. They kill on a moment's notice because they're trying to shake our will, they're trying to create fear, they're trying to affect people's behaviors. And we're simply not going to let them do that.

The term was most recently heard in the President's 2006 State of the Union Address (Bush, 2006a):

Our own generation is in a long war against a determined enemy -- a war that will be fought by Presidents of both parties, who will need steady bipartisan support from the Congress.

The Department of Defense is also shifting to 'Long War'. In the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (DOD, 2006) it beats 'Global War' 29 to 6. We might expect it will soon be the more prevalent usage.

Statistics, as we know, can be used to prove - or disprove - anything. Evidence suggests simply that 'GWOT' is fading, 'Long War' is on the rise. However, the principal

concern of this paper is whether 'war' is an appropriate response or the proper word in our present situation. Let us move on to that.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH 'WAR'?

We all know what's wrong with war as a human activity; we focus now on the word as a descriptor for whatever it is that we are to do. When the activity is carried on at an international level, outside your borders, and there are massive activations and deployments of armed forces, the word 'war' takes on a specific meaning. We err, grievously, if we apply the War(2) usage of the term to armed forces that exist principally for the War(1) purposes. We err further when 'war', in the military arena, is against an object incompatible with those War(1) purposes.

You cannot have armed conflict against 'terror', an emotion; it only increases the terror.

You cannot have armed conflict against 'terrorism', which is a tactic, a tool, any more that you can against junk mail; it must be against the persons or organizations who use terrorism.

Armed conflict against 'terrorists' is a special case for War(1). Sending the phalanxes of Infantry or the Strategic Air Command against one or a few terrorists is both ineffective and a waste of resources; for that purpose send the Special Operations Command. Normal armed conflict (if there can be such a thing) would be appropriate only when you've located a significant organization or concentration of terrorists.

IRAQ: ITS PROBLEMS, OUR PRESENCE

The current objective in Iraq is to form and stabilize a democratic government which will solve (or perhaps exacerbate, if on our terms?) all their problems. It's human nature for us to see that our way of looking at things is the norm, while others have a warped view. The Shias and Sunnis, close to civil war, would seem to prefer sectarian separatism, while the Kurds would opt for their own autonomy.

Iraq, not a nation until after World War I, was created as a British Protectorate in 1921, attempting to meld Kurds, Shias, and Sunni in an enormous pool of oil. It became independent in 1931. There are currently five parties at odds with each other in Iraq: Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, the embryo government, and the Coalition. The central question is whether they can come to the sense of 'respect' that means to 'tolerate'.

The culture of the U.S. and the Allied Coalition is predominantly Judeo-Christian. We are simply not prepared to appreciate the mandate, context, caveats, and nuances of the Koran. It's one thing to be an infidel; quite another to be both infidel and overlord.

SO WHAT IS LEFT?

"MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR"

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS, 2005) defines Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as:

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW.

The JCS Doctrine for Joint Operations (JCS, 2001, pp. I-2,4) summarizes the goals and concerns involved in MOOTW thus:

The general goals of US military operations during MOOTW involving the use or threat of force are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace. ...

As recent history has shown, a humanitarian effort not involving the use or threat of force can quickly escalate into armed conflict. Therefore, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation. ...

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	MILITARY OPERATIONS	GENERAL US GOALS	REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT <i>Military Operations Other Than War</i>	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Nation Assistance
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations, from Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Chapter III - United States Military Power. (JCS, 2000, p. III-15)

There are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and MOOTW, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

One object of war is to have the enemy fear and respect you; 'respect' in the sense of avoiding harm to or interference with you.

Generally speaking, the object of MOOTW is to stabilize, to restore a proper (in our eyes) government and infrastructure, to defuse resentments and tensions. Can that defusing convert the populace to 'respect', as in mitigating the feelings engendered by the precursor war? This sense of 'respect' is more to have due regard for the feelings, wishes, rights, or traditions of each other, to recognize and abide by laws.

THE U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was published just prior to the initiation of combat in Iraq, laying out the 4-D - Defeat, Deny, Diminish, Defend - plan for our protection (Executive Office, 2003, pp. 11-12):

The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them. To accomplish these tasks we will simultaneously act on four fronts.

[1] The United States and its partners will defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. ...

[2] We will deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory. ... Where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter the threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting terrorism.

[3] We will diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk. ...

[4] Most importantly, we will defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad by both proactively protecting our homeland and extending our defenses to ensure we identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.

Victory against terrorism will not occur as a single, defining moment. ... However, through the sustained effort to compress the scope and capability of terrorist organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them within state borders, the United States and its friends and allies will secure a world ... where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.

Victory, therefore, will be secured only as long as the United States and the international community maintain their vigilance and work tirelessly to prevent terrorists from inflicting horrors like those of September 11, 2001.

IS THIS "WAR"?

On 16 October 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, (2003) sent a memo, Global War on Terrorism, to senior officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, and to Generals Richard Myers and Peter Pace. It addressed concerns and posed questions on the progress of GWOT, seven months after our entry into Iraq, the text, a rather chilling and introspective appraisal, follows:

... Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment? Can a big institution change fast enough? Is the USG [U.S. Government] changing fast enough?

DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere — one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.

With respect to global terrorism, the record since September 11th seems to be:

We are having mixed results with Al Qaida, although we have put considerable pressure on them — nonetheless, a great many remain at large.

USG has made reasonable progress in capturing or killing the top 55 Iraqis.

USG has made somewhat slower progress tracking down the Taliban — Omar, Hekmatyar, etc.

With respect to the Ansar Al-Islam, we are just getting started.

Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?

Are the changes we have and are making too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves, although we have made many sensible, logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?

Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop

terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.

Do we need a new organization? ...

Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get"?

It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog. ...

There can be little doubt that U.S. Armed Forces see the present war as War(1). In his assessment of the Department of Defense's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, wrote of expecting enhanced combat power and more lethal Armed Forces (DOD, 2006, pp. A-4,5):

The QDR properly focuses on the War on Terrorism as our first priority. We will enhance our expeditionary combat power and shape the Services to be lighter, yet more lethal, more sustainable and more agile. We will train additional Special Operations Forces and enable traditional ground forces to conduct foreign training and security missions in addition to combat operations. This expansion allows SOF to undertake longer duration, high intensity tasks and augments the irregular warfare capability of the entire force.

A renewed emphasis on Human Intelligence, increased airborne surveillance and airlift capacity, and specialized naval forces configured for coastal and riverine operations further complement irregular warfare capacity. Additionally, the QDR recognizes Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) as a U.S. government wide mission of increasing importance and identifies military support to SSTR as a core mission.

Finally, by emphasizing greater cultural awareness and language skills, the QDR acknowledges that victory in this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects. These cultural and language capabilities also enhance effectiveness in a coalition setting during conventional operations.

Jeffrey Record (2003, pp. 2-4) in Bounding the Global War on Terrorism provides us with a thoughtful analysis of the GWOT as a War, "perhaps the most over-used metaphor in America":

American political discourse over the past several decades has embraced "war" as a metaphor for dealing with all kinds of "enemies," domestic and foreign. One cannot, it seems, be serious about dealing with this or that problem short of making "war" on it. ... "War" is perhaps the most over-used metaphor in America.

Traditionally, however, war has involved military operations between states or between a state and an insurgent enemy for ultimate control of that state. In both cases the primary medium for war has been combat between fielded military forces, be they regular (state) or irregular (nonstate) forces. Yet terrorist organizations do not field military forces as such and, in the case of

al-Qaeda and its associated partners, are trans-state organizations that are pursuing nonterritorial ends. As such, and given their secretive, cellular, dispersed, and decentralized "order of battle," they are not subject to conventional military destruction.

Indeed, the key to their defeat lies in the realms of intelligence and police work, with military forces playing an important but nonetheless supporting role. ... If there is an analogy for the GWOT, it is the international war on illicit narcotics.

But these "wars" on terrorism and drugs are not really wars as most Americans, including the professional military, have come to understand the meaning of the term since the United States became a world power. ...

Traditional wars also provided clear standards of measuring success in the form of territory gained and enemy forces destroyed or otherwise removed from combat. But these standards were always of limited utility against irregular enemies that fought to different standards of success, and they are of practically no use in gauging success against a terrorist threat like al-Qaeda. ... Additionally al-Qaeda has demonstrated impressive regenerative powers, in part because, as Daniel Byman (2003) points out, it is:

not just a distinct terrorist organization: it is a movement that seeks to inspire and coordinate other groups and individuals. Even if Al-Qaeda is taking losses beyond its ability to recuperate, there is still a much broader Islamist movement that is hostile to the United States, seeks to overthrow U.S. allies and is committed to mass casualty terrorist violence. ... The conceptual key is this: Al-Qaeda is not a single terrorist group but a global insurgency.

Dr. Record also points out that GWOT, other than in the two combat campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, is better seen as MOOTW. Its historical analog may be the Cold War, in the sense that "Operation Iraqi Freedom saddled the U.S. Armed Forces, especially the U.S. Army, with costly and open-ended imperial policing and nation-building responsibilities outside the professional military's traditional mission portfolio." Whether or not the Cold War nation-building responsibilities were part of the military portfolio is debatable.

WHAT KIND OF "WAR"?

COLD WAR?

Donald Grosz (2005, p. 2) writes in a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Defending Against Terrorism: Is It Bankrupting America?:

During the last half of the twentieth century, America led the struggle of the free world to contain and ultimately cause the downfall of communism and the Soviet Union. Today, our multi-front Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, has replaced the Cold War as our most significant struggle against an ideology and foreign adversary. Where defeating the "Evil Empire" provided the major

focus of our National Security efforts and expenditures, defeating terrorism, especially extremist Islamic terrorism, has gained a prominent place in our National Security Strategy and in our national budget. Defeating terrorism as a threat to our very existence is not unlike our Cold War goal that necessitated our costly containment strategy. Isolating the ideology of Islamic terrorists, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, and containing communism are indeed an endeavor of similar if not equal significance. In their April 2004 report, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security (Turner, 2004, p. i) recognized that

...we are at war with a brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism that is extremely dangerous, is growing, and is a true threat to our people, our economy, and our way of life. Let us be clear – this is a war for nothing less than our survival.

The analogy between the Cold War and GWOT is tenuous at best. Costs are the principal pragmatic comparison: those of maintaining in Europe the Seventh Army (later the V and VII Corps), USFA (Austria) and TRUST (Trieste), the Third and Sixteenth Air Forces, and the Sixth Fleet; casualties were minimal, non-combatant.

Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College, Fulton MO, on 9 March 1946 marked the start of that which we knew as the Cold War: in Churchill's words, "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic". The Berlin Wall cracked on 9 November 1989, leading in turn to the crumbling of the Iron Curtain.

The Cold War was an armed truce, in the main, a melodrama featuring the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., played in the theater of Western Europe. Its weapons were power politics, economic pressures, hostile propaganda, espionage and sabotage, parades of armies and arms: it was flag waving and sabre rattling without warfighting.

HUNT?

Dr. Colin Gray (2003, p. 5) notes in his monograph Maintaining Effective Deterrence:

The conflict with global terrorism, even in its more restricted form in the guise of the well-networked al Qaeda, bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most people understandably call a war. The cutting edge of the counterterrorist effort is likely to be intelligence, especially multinational cooperation on intelligence, and muscular policework. All of which is fairly plausible, but it is by no means certain that U.S. national security strategy reduces to chasing terrorists of no fixed abode. Terrorists and their backers do provide some targets for military action, and the jury will long be out on just how significant a challenge they pose to American vital interests, including the world order of which the United States is the principal guardian.

A hunt smacks of something that would involve Special Forces. You don't send the Infantry on a hunt. And it's impractical if the fields of action - principally Afghanistan and Iraq - cannot be closed to incursion or retreat. One suspects that our Rules Of

Engagement require respect for national borders, but finding no signs in the middle of the desert or mountains, mistakes will happen.

Intelligence and policework speak to developing credible information. And that's really what GWOT should be all about: developing information and then acting upon it before an act of terrorism can take place.

WHO?

John Haberkern (2004, p. i) speaks to the eternal problem where you can't tell the players without a program:

Unlike prior enemies, there is no clear state for the U.S to direct its national powers against, but instead a loose organization of groups. Groups that purportedly have political ends to achieve, but groups that do not use political methods to achieve those ends. They instead resort to terrorism as a method against states, strong and otherwise, that they feel have oppressed and marginalized them. These groups are not using political, military or economic methods, but a continuing flow of recruits to execute terrorism.

These groups do not have to be, or to represent, states, and may in fact have more freedom of action as independents well versed in ignoring borders.

WHY?

Jeffrey Record (2005, p. 21), writing in Parameters on "Why the Strong Lose" looks at the Islamic warrior (?) who can be completely irrational by our norms:

In his landmark study of suicide terrorism from 1980 through 2003, Robert Pape discovered that, contrary to conventional wisdom, almost all suicide attacks during that period, including those in Iraq, were motivated primarily by nationalism and conducted against the territory or forces of democracies and quasi-democracies — specifically, the United States, France, India, Israel, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey — perceived to be occupying, or supporting the occupation, of territory the terrorists considered to be their homeland.

Vigilance and, again, intelligence and policework are the only tools we have at hand.

HOW?

Lt.Col. Tracey Skelton. (2004, pp. i-ii) examines changes in operational support, working to bring the Special Operations Command more directly into supporting and prosecuting the GWOT:

After the events on September 11, 2001 ... Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld forced a paradigm shift when he mandated that USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command] be the lead agency and supported command in the global war on terrorism. ...

In today's global environment, asymmetric thinking is vital during unconventional warfare operations, especially when it comes to command and control of special operations forces conducting a plethora of strategic operations from major force engagements to small teams conducting covert actions. ...

The new operational construct will be situational dependent and may take on many different structures. In a global war on terrorism, the campaign will be fought around the world and across the full spectrum of warfare. The majority of the actions will be against high value targets with both military and political strategic importance. To prosecute numerous operations quickly and efficiently, USSOCOM will employ small unconventional warfare ground teams supported by conventional forces -- predominantly air forces.

What remains - no small task - is to complete and vet the DOD Joint Forces transformation: polish the Brigade Combat Team order of battle; rebalance forces among Active, Reserve, and Guard; field new weapons, robots, aircraft and ship types. Expanding and restructuring the Special Operations Command to take on further and deeper responsibility for missions and operations against terrorists is but one piece of the process.

Of late, the combat troops of the Active Army have been backed up by the National Guard. But there has been a change in combat roles and tools. For example, tactical air support with Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) now serve as the ground-pounder's artillery support. We now see National Guard Artillery units being deployed in the role of Military Police.

The Reserve Forces are where we find the preponderance of specialist units which are needed to support MOOTW: Aviation Support, Base and Port Security, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Intelligence, Legal, Medical, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, Transportation. The Active Army needs greater immediate capability in those areas.

THE BOTTOM LINE, IF THERE CAN BE ONE

The use of 'GWOT' and its variations is on the wane in the Department of Defense. Based on Google™ searches, there is no clear pattern or preference observed for terminology in the Department of Homeland Security.

The use of 'Long War' is building, but there is perhaps an unfavorable connotation as to duration. Will that have a political backlash? Will meeting military recruiting and retention goals continue to be a struggle?

One phrasing, seen occasionally, which seems fit is 'war against terrorist networks', but it has no known proponents.

It is hoped this paper may serve to strengthen the proper distinction between 'war' and 'military operations other than war'.

EPILOGUE: CONTRASTING THOUGHTS TO CONSIDER

On 7 October 2001, not long after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this was the ending of the Osama Bin Laden (2001) message heard via Qatar-based al-Jazeera television:

As to America, I say to it and its people a few words:
I swear to God that America will not live in peace
before peace reigns in Palestine, and
before all the army of the infidels depart
the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him.
God is the Greatest and glory be to Islam.

While one is likely to disagree with the objectives of Sinn Fein/Irish Republican Army or Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters, it remains that their methods in Northern Ireland were all too often harassment, terrorizing, maiming, and killing of their opposite numbers, and of citizens just hoping to stay out of harm's way. Tommy Sands (1986)² put it very forcefully and emotionally in There Were Roses:

"An eye for an eye" was all that filled their minds.
And another eye for another eye, 'til everyone is blind.

There were roses, roses, there were roses.
And the tears of the people ran together.

Patrick G. Skelly
Professor Sanders Marble
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NOTES

¹ This paper does not discuss the propriety of our 'war on terrorism' nor the pragmatic approach to its declaration and conduct. Although American Armed Forces have been and are engaged in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as supporting operations in our 'homeland'; this paper speaks principally to the context of our ground forces in the Iraqi operations, without prejudice against any other service or operations.

² Tommy [Sands] recalls one incident from 1974 in his classic song There Were Roses. A Protestant friend of his was killed in an act of senseless violence. When the local Protestants looked for a Catholic to kill in retaliation, they ironically chose a man who had been good friends with the original victim - and with Tommy Sands. "It took me almost ten years to write the song, because I saw more than just the events. It summed up war, how people can be put into little boxes and told they're different. It still happens. You know, George Bush says, 'We have nothing against the Iraqi people, it's Saddam.' Some weeks later, a hundred thousand Iraqi people are dead, and Saddam's still there. I wonder what the victory is." (Winick, 1996)

This paper is dedicated to the fallen soldiers of all nations, of all wars.

May they have no more hills to climb,
nor cold, nor rain, nor mud, nor enemy fire
and may they now rest in Peace.

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Patrick Skelly, 26 February 2006

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